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 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
UNITED TRANSIT LEADERSHIP ORGANIZATION, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6381 
 
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, 
 
                                                 Employer.         
________________________________________ 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Transit Leadership Organization has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: Employees assigned to the Department of Buses (Responsibility 
Center Numbers 3000 through 3944 and 5000 through 5492) 
holding a Hay Title of (i) Assistant General Superintendent of 
Maintenance; (ii) Assistant General Superintendent of 
Transportation; (iii) Assistant General Superintendent of Facilities; 
(iv) Superintendent of Maintenance; (v) Superintendent of 
Technical Support; (vi) Superintendent of Transportation; (vii) 
Superintendent of Transportation Compliance; (viii) Superintendent 
of Facilities; (ix) Superintendent of Material Control; and (x) 
Superintendent of Storeroom Operations. 
Certification - C-6381 - 2 - 
 
 
   
   Excluded: Based upon their managerial and/or confidential duties, employees 
assigned to the Department of Buses (Responsibility Center 
Numbers 3000 through 3944 and 5000 through 5492) holding a 
Hay Title of (i) Assistant General Manager of Operations; (ii) 
Assistant General Manager of Strategic Planning; (iii) General 
Superintendent of Maintenance; (iv) General Superintendent of 
Transportation; (v) General Superintendent of Support Services; 
(vi) General Superintendent of Safety and Environmental 
Management; (vii) General Superintendent of Facilities; (viii) 
Assistant General Superintendent of Maintenance working in the 
Office of General Manager of Depot Operations; (ix) Assistant 
General Superintendent of Transportation working in the Office of 
General Manager of Road Operations and the Bus Command 
Center; and all other employees. 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Transit Leadership Organization.  The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party.  Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED:  November 6, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
                                                      
                                                                 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
UNITED TRANSIT LEADERSHIP ORGANIZATION, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6344 
 
MTA BUS COMPANY, 
 
                                                 Employer.         
________________________________________ 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Transit Leadership Organization has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: Employees holding a Hay Title of (i) Assistant General 
Superintendent of Maintenance; (ii) Assistant General 
Superintendent of Transportation; (iii) Assistant General 
Superintendent of Facilities; (iv) Superintendent of Maintenance; (v) 
Superintendent of Technical Support; (vi) Superintendent of 
Transportation; (vii) Superintendent of Transportation Compliance; 
(viii) Superintendent of Facilities; (ix) Superintendent of Material 
Control; and (x) Superintendent of Storeroom Operations. 
   
   Excluded: Based upon their managerial and/or confidential duties, employees 
Certification - C-6344 - 2 - 
 
 
holding a Hay Title of (i) Assistant General Manager of Operations; 
(ii) Assistant General Manager of Strategic Planning; (iii) General 
Superintendent of Maintenance; (iv) General Superintendent of 
Transportation; (v) General Superintendent of Support Services; 
(vi) General Superintendent of Safety and Environmental 
Management; (vii) General Superintendent of Facilities; (viii) 
Assistant General Superintendent of Maintenance working in the 
Office of General Manager of Depot Operations; (ix) Assistant 
General Superintendent of Transportation working in the Office of 
General Manager of Road Operations and the Bus Command 
Center; and all other employees. 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Transit Leadership Organization.  The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party.  Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED:  November 6, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
                                                                
     
 
                                                                    
 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 118, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6479 
 
TOWN OF FARMINGTON, 
 
                                                 Employer.  
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 118 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the 
unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full-time and regular part-time water/sewer employees working 
PWMA’s, MEO’s, WWTP trainees, laborers, chief operators and 
plant operators. 
   
   Excluded: All other as defined by the ACT. 
 
Certification - C-6479 - 2 - 
 
 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 118.  The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party.  
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED:  November 6, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
 
     
                                                                    
 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
UNITED TRANSIT LEADERSHIP ORGANIZATION, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6347 
 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
 
                                                 Employer.         
________________________________________ 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Transit Leadership Organization has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: Employees assigned to the Department of Buses (Responsibility 
Center Numbers 3000 through 3944 and 5000 through 5492) 
holding a Hay Title of (i) Assistant General Superintendent of 
Maintenance; (ii) Assistant General Superintendent of 
Transportation; (iii) Assistant General Superintendent of Facilities; 
(iv) Superintendent of Maintenance; (v) Superintendent of 
Technical Support; (vi) Superintendent of Transportation; (vii) 
Superintendent of Transportation Compliance; (viii) Superintendent 
of Facilities; (ix) Superintendent of Material Control; and (x) 
Superintendent of Storeroom Operations. 
Certification - C-6347 - 2 - 
 
 
   
   Excluded: Based upon their managerial and/or confidential duties, employees 
assigned to the Department of Buses (Responsibility Center 
Numbers 3000 through 3944 and 5000 through 5492) holding a 
Hay Title of (i) Assistant General Manager of Operations; (ii) 
Assistant General Manager of Strategic Planning; (iii) General 
Superintendent of Maintenance; (iv) General Superintendent of 
Transportation; (v) General Superintendent of Support Services; 
(vi) General Superintendent of Safety and Environmental 
Management; (vii) General Superintendent of Facilities; (viii) 
Assistant General Superintendent of Maintenance working in the 
Office of General Manager of Depot Operations; (ix) Assistant 
General Superintendent of Transportation working in the Office of 
General Manager of Road Operations and the Bus Command 
Center; and all other employees. 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Transit Leadership Organization.  The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party.  Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED:  November 6, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
      
                                                                    
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
UNITED TRANSIT LEADERSHIP ORGANIZATION, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6346 
 
MANHATTAN and BRONX SURFACE TRANSIT 
OPERATING AUTHORITY, 
 
                                                 Employer.         
________________________________________ 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Transit Leadership Organization has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: Employees assigned to the Department of Buses (Responsibility 
Center Numbers 3000 through 3944 and 5000 through 5492) 
holding a Hay Title of (i) Assistant General Superintendent of 
Maintenance; (ii) Assistant General Superintendent of 
Transportation; (iii) Assistant General Superintendent of Facilities; 
(iv) Superintendent of Maintenance; (v) Superintendent of 
Technical Support; (vi) Superintendent of Transportation; (vii) 
Superintendent of Transportation Compliance; (viii) Superintendent 
of Facilities; (ix) Superintendent of Material Control; and (x) 
Certification - C-6381 - 2 - 
 
 
Superintendent of Storeroom Operations. 
   
   Excluded: Based upon their managerial and/or confidential duties, employees 
assigned to the Department of Buses (Responsibility Center 
Numbers 3000 through 3944 and 5000 through 5492) holding a 
Hay Title of (i) Assistant General Manager of Operations; (ii) 
Assistant General Manager of Strategic Planning; (iii) General 
Superintendent of Maintenance; (iv) General Superintendent of 
Transportation; (v) General Superintendent of Support Services; 
(vi) General Superintendent of Safety and Environmental 
Management; (vii) General Superintendent of Facilities; (viii) 
Assistant General Superintendent of Maintenance working in the 
Office of General Manager of Depot Operations; (ix) Assistant 
General Superintendent of Transportation working in the Office of 
General Manager of Road Operations and the Bus Command 
Center; and all other employees. 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Transit Leadership Organization.  The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party.  Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED:  November 6, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
                                               
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6464 
 
TOWN OF BETHLEHEM, 
 
                                                 Employer, 
 
           -and- 
 
BETHLEHEM POLICE OFFICERS’ 
UNION (PBA), 
 
                                                          Intervenor/Incumbent. 
 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected;1 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
                                                     
1 This unit has been represented by the Bethlehem Police Officers’ Union (PBA), which 
notified PERB, by letter dated August 2, 2017, that it supports the petition and disclaims 
any interest in further representing the unit. 
 
Certification - C-6464 - 2 - 
 
 
 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 294 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the 
unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All full and part-time non-supervisory Police Officers and 
Detectives, including Provisionals employed by the Town. 
   
   Excluded: Chief, Deputy Chiefs, Commanders, Captains, Lieutenants, 
Detective Sergeants, Sergeants and civilian employees. 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 294.  The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party.  
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED:  November 6, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
                                                                 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY SHERIFF’S EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6462 
 
COUNTY OF CHAUTAUQUA AND CHAUTAUQUA 
COUNTY SHERIFF, 
 
                                                 Employer, 
 
           -and- 
 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
 
                                                          Intervenor/Incumbent. 
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Chautauqua County Sheriff’s Employees 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
Certification - C-6462 - 2 - 
 
 
 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: Pilot; Cook; Emergency and Police Dispatcher; Emergency and 
Police Dispatcher Trainee; Senior Emergency and Police 
Dispatcher; Correction Officer; Senior Correction Officer; 
Recreation Specialist/Correction Officer; Seasonal Deputy Sheriffs 
when assigned to the navigation patrol; part-time Correction 
Officers; part-time Emergency and Police Dispatchers; part-time 
Emergency and Police Dispatcher Trainee; part-time Pilot; and 
part-time Cook. 
   
   Excluded: All other employees of Chautauqua County. 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Chautauqua County Sheriff’s Employees Association.  
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party.  Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED:  November 6, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
                                                 
 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
 
________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 445, 
 
                                                          Petitioner, 
 
           -and-                                                             CASE NO. C-6480 
 
TOWN OF MINISINK, 
 
                                                 Employer. 
          
________________________________________ 
 
 
 CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure, and it appearing that a negotiating 
representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested by the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act; 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 445 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the 
unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: Foreman, Motor Equipment Operator, Heavy Equipment Operator 
and Laborer in the Town Highway Department. 
   
   Excluded: Highway Department Superintendent. 
 
Certification - C-6480 - 2 - 
 
 
 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 445.  The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party.  
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED:  November 6, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
 
     
                                                                    
 
  
  
STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
_________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL 
OFFICERS AND POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-33576 
- and -          
  
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY 
SUPERVISION), 
Respondent. 
_______________________________________ 
 
LIPPES MATHIAS WEXLER FRIEDMAN LLP (THIEN-NGA NGUYN-CLARK 
  of counsel), for Charging Party 
 
 MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL (RONALD S. 
 EHRLICH of counsel), for Respondent 
 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (Department of 
Corrections and Community Services) (State or DOCCS) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the State violated §§ 209-a.1(a), (b), and (g) 
of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act).1  The ALJ found that the State 
violated the Act by refusing to afford Correction Officer Nicole Hassett, who had not yet 
completed her probationary term, representation by the New York State Correctional and 
Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA) during questioning by representatives of 
the DOCCS Office of Special Investigations (OSI).  The ALJ found that the State also 
violated the Act by arranging for another NYSCOPBA steward to represent Correction 
Officer Matthew Krzeminski after refusing to allow NYSCOPBA steward Michael Maltese 
to represent Krzeminski.     
                                                     
1 48 PERB ¶ 4602 (2015). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
 The State excepts to the ALJ’s decision on three grounds.  First, the State contends 
that the ALJ did not properly apply the standard necessary to prove a violation of § 209-
a.1(g), by allowing statements allegedly made by the interrogators regarding Hassett’s 
probationary status to factor in determining that it reasonably appeared that she may have 
been a subject of a potential disciplinary action.   The State faults the ALJ for not 
considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the interview. 
 Second, the State asserts that the ALJ erred in finding that DOCCS selected 
NYSCOPBA steward Jeffrey Helmicki to provide representation for Krzeminski in place of 
Maltese, thus violating § 209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act, on the basis that the record does 
not establish any such selection of Helmicki, who was the only NYSCOPBA representative 
other than Maltese who was available at that time and place. 
 Finally, the State argues that the ALJ’s remedial order that the State destroy any 
documents maintained by the State that contain information obtained at Hassett’s 
questioning, on the ground that the remedy goes beyond what is provided by § 209-a.1(g), 
is overly broad, and unduly burdensome.2  
 NYSCOPBA supports the ALJ’s decision.   
 For the following reasons, we affirm the ALJ’s finding that DOCCS violated § 209-
                                                     
2 We note that the State does not except to the ALJ’s dismissal of its claim that it had 
established the affirmative defense under § 209-a.1(g) of an available contractual remedy 
excluding any statements made at a subsequent disciplinary hearing on the ground that 
Hasset, as a probationary employee, was excluded from such provision of the parties’ 
collective bargaining agreement.  Additionally, the State does not except to the ALJ’s 
finding that Hassett requested that she be afforded union representation at the interview.  
NYSCOPBA did not cross-except to the ALJ’s finding “no violation of the Act in connection 
with DOCCS’s refusal to allow Maltese to represent Krzeminski.”  48 PERB ¶ 4602 at 
4871.  Therefore, “any such exceptions have been waived and are not properly before us.” 
Buffalo Sewer Auth, 50 PERB ¶ 3020, 3083, n. 2 (2017), citing Rules of Procedure            
§ 213.2(b) (4); NYCTA (Burke), 49 PERB ¶ 3021, 3072, n. 4 (2016) (citing cases).  
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a.1(g) of the Act by refusing to allow Hassett union representation at her interview with 
OSI, and the remedial order related thereto, but reverse her finding that DOCCS interfered 
with Krzeminski’s representation in violation of §§ 209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act. 
FACTS 
 After a January 21, 2014 incident of alleged workplace violence—that is, the throwing 
of food by at least one Correction Officer at a civilian employee—in the mess hall at Five 
Points Correctional Facility, Senior Investigator Donald Oliver of DOCCS’s Office of 
Special Investigation (OSI) was assigned to investigate the mess hall incident.3  On 
January 23, as part of his investigation, Oliver went to the facility and interviewed the 
civilian involved, in addition to other civilian staff who were working in the mess hall at the 
time of the incident.4  Oliver testified that, because they were questioned only as 
witnesses, none of these interviewed civilian employees were permitted to have union 
representation.5 
 On January 28, 2014, Oliver questioned the security staff who had been present in 
the mess hall at the time of the incident, as well as some civilian staff who had not been 
available on January 23, 2014.  Six to eight correction officers were interviewed at that 
time; all were afforded union representation.6  Oliver explained that he “wasn’t sure as to 
who was on what end of the table and who else was throwing food . . . .  So we gave 
everybody union representation at that point in time.”7  By contrast, the civilians 
interviewed on January 28 were not permitted union representation, according to Oliver, 
because they were merely witnesses.   
                                                     
3 Jt Ex 3; Tr, p. 83. 
4 Id. 
5 Tr, p. 84. 
6 Tr, p. 88. 
7 Tr, p. 88. 
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 Of the corrections officers present during the incident, only Hassett and one other 
officer, who had transferred to another facility, were probationers.8  Although Hassett was 
originally scheduled to be among those interviewed on January 28 or the following day, 
Oliver testified that he was instructed by his supervisor not to conduct her interview at the 
facility, but rather at DOCCS’s headquarters in Albany, and with a stenographer present, 
because of her probationary status.9  
 NYSCOPBA steward Michael Maltese provided union representation to the correction 
officers questioned on January 28 and/or January 29, 2014.10  Maltese testified that Oliver 
told him that Hassett would not be questioned at the facility, but at “Building 2” in Albany, 
because “she was probationary.”11  However, he testified that “[i]n my experience when 
someone’s called to Building 2 for questioning, it’s—it’s not for—it’s not for good.  Nothing 
good can come of it.  You feel as if you’re in trouble at that point.”12  Maltese and Hassett 
both testified that “the interview in Albany was cancelled due to the weather.”13   
 Hassett testified that “I was confused and wasn’t sure why I was going to Building 2 
when everyone else was talked to at the facility.  I thought that I might have done 
something wrong, or could have been in trouble for something.”14  Hassett testified that 
she was aware of DOCCS’s rules regarding workplace violence and that, under those 
rules, “if I witnessed workplace violence, that I would have to report it, and if not I would be 
                                                     
8 Tr, p. 90. 
9 Tr, pp. 90-91. 
10 Tr, p. 24.  The exact dates of the interviews identified by Maltese and Oliver range from 
January 28 through February 3, 2014. 
11 Tr, p. 27. 
12 Id. 
13 Tr, pp. 28, 47. 
14 Tr, p. 46. 
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subject to discipline.”15  Prior to the questioning on February 10, 2014, she had not 
reported any incidents of workplace violence, despite having witnessed the incident in the 
mess hall.16  At the time of the questioning, Hassett’s understanding was that, if DOCCS 
thought she had “done something wrong” she “could be terminated.”17  She testified that 
during her questioning, the investigators “told me that if they wanted me gone, they would 
just get rid of me, that they—I would not get an NOD [Notice of Discipline].  They would 
just fire me.”18 
 On February 10, Hassett was questioned at the facility.  Hassett testified that she was 
accompanied into the interview room by Maltese, and after they sat down, “I was told that I 
was not allowed to have a union rep, that Officer Maltese had to leave the room.”19  
Hassett also stated that when Maltese asked why Hassett was not entitled to union 
representation, “they told him that I was a probationary officer.”20  Maltese directed 
Hassett to “make sure that I asked for my union rep and told them that I wanted one.”21 
 After Maltese left the room, Hassett asked the investigators why she was not entitled 
to union representation, “and I also told them I wanted my union rep in the room with 
me.”22  She testified that the investigators “told me that I was not allowed to have one.”23   
Hassett was not cross-examined, and Maltese’s testimony was consistent with Hassett’s. 
 The State’s testimony varied from that of Hassett and Maltese in certain key aspects.  
Oliver was accompanied by Assistant Deputy Chief Horace Thomas Knight, and Five 
                                                     
15 Tr, p. 54. 
16 Tr, p. 54. 
17 Tr, pp. 54-55. 
18 Tr, p. 55. 
19 Tr, p. 48. 
20 Tr, p. 49. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Tr, p. 49. 
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Points Deputy Superintendent for Security Raymond J. Coveny, interviewed both Hassett 
and Correction Officer Matthew Krzeminski on February 10, 2014.  Oliver testified that he 
and Knight asked Coveny to be present for Hassett’s questioning because they “were 
going to be interviewing her without a union rep and . . .  we asked [Coveny] to sit in so 
that she didn’t feel that we were trying to intimidate her or anything else, that there was 
somebody that she knew from the facility.24 
 Knight testified that Coveny was asked to participate because they “sometimes we 
have captains or deps, someone in the administrators [sic] if we think that there could be 
some issues.  A lot of times we will have a dep or a captain sit in on the interviews as 
witnesses.  That way it’s not our word against other people’s words.”25  Knight further 
testified that he was involved in the questioning because his supervisor was concerned 
that Maltese had “gotten verbal with some of our investigators” in the past, and in order “to 
explain to [Maltese] that her not being afforded a union rep had nothing to do with her 
being probationary.  It was because she was only a witness.”26 
 Maltese testified that when he and Hassett entered the room where the questioning 
was to take place, Knight asked to see Maltese outside the room.27  As Maltese recounted 
the discussion, Oliver, Knight, and Coveny went out with him, and told him that “because 
of her probationary status she would not be entitled to union representation and I would 
not be allowed in the room.”28  Maltese continued to argue that Hassett was entitled to 
union representation and said that if he was not present during the interview he would pull 
                                                     
24 Tr, pp. 96-97. 
25 Tr, p. 121. 
26 Tr, pp. 119-120. 
27 Tr, p. 31. 
28 Id. 
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Hassett out.29  
 Oliver testified, however, that Knight told Maltese that “we’ve gotten direction that 
she’s only a witness.  We’re not going to allow her a union rep.”30  Their subsequent 
reports, however, both refer to her probationary status and her status as a witness.31  
 At this point, Oliver, Knight, and Coveny returned to the room in which Hassett had 
been waiting.  Maltese left the area and made a telephone call to NYSCOPBA’s 
headquarters in Albany about the situation.  Maltese was told that he would get a call 
back.  
 Maltese testified that he returned to the room where the questioning was being held.  
It appeared to Maltese that the questioning of Hassett had begun, so he asked for a five 
minute delay, indicating that he was waiting for a response from NYSCOPBA 
headquarters.32  According to Maltese, Oliver said to him directly “[y]ou can call whoever 
you want. This questioning is moving forward.”33  It is undisputed that Maltese, in his own 
words, “stormed into the room.  I hit my hands on the–on the table they were sitting at and 
I called them cowards.”34  Oliver, Knight, and Coveny testified that Maltese said to Oliver 
and Knight “This is fucking bullshit” and “You’re a fucking coward,” and repeated that both 
Oliver and Knight were “fucking cowards.”35  Oliver testified that Maltese was 
                                                     
29 Tr, p. 39. 
30 Tr, p. 100. 
31 In his February 10, 2014 memo to DOCCS Director of Operations James Ferro, Oliver 
wrote that Knight said to Maltese that Hassett was not entitled to union representation 
because “she was a probationary employee whom [sic] is only a witness to an alleged 
incident.”  Respondent Ex 2.  Similarly, Knight’s memo to Ferro states that “[i]t was 
predetermined that Officer Hassett was not entitled to union representation because she 
was a probationary employee and not suspected of any misconduct.”  Respondent Ex 3. 
32 Tr, p. 32. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Tr, pp. 101, 121-123, 135. 
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“screaming.”36  Maltese did not deny using these words and admitted being “loud”, but he 
denied being threatening.37  Coveny placed a hand on Maltese’s chest and led him from 
the room. 
Coveny testified that “[he] felt it was [his] obligation not to let it get any further than that, 
and [he] got up and stood between the table and Officer Maltese and told [Maltese] he 
needed to leave the room.”38  
 After Hassett’s interview, the investigators moved on to Krzeminski.  When Coveny 
came out to bring Krzeminski into the interview room, Coveny approached Maltese, and 
informed him that Krzeminski would be afforded representation, but that Maltese would not 
be permitted to represent him.39  Krzeminski objected to not being allowed Maltese as his 
representative.   
 Knight testified that the decision not to allow Maltese to represent Krzeminski that day 
was the result of the telephone conversation Knight had with DOCCS’s Director of 
Operations James Ferro and another supervisor, Vern Fonda.  Knight testified that Ferro 
and Fonda had instructed him to not allow Maltese to represent Krzeminski’s based on 
what Ferro and Fonda characterized as Maltese’s threatening behavior at Hassett’s 
interview.40    
      Correction Officer Jeffrey Helmicki, also a NYSCOPBA steward, was called down to 
represent Krzeminski.  As the ALJ noted, the record is not clear as to who actually called 
for Helmicki to provide union representation.  Both Oliver and Knight testified that Helmicki 
                                                     
36 Tr, p. 101. 
37 Tr, p. 39. 
38 Tr, p. 135. 
39 Tr, p. 34. 
40 Tr, p. 127. 
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walked into the room with Krzeminski.41  None of the investigators—Oliver, Knight, or 
Coveny—were asked by NYSCOPBA or the State who made the call to Helmicki.  Maltese 
said that he did not make the call or ask anyone else to do so.42  Helmicki testified that 
while he was on duty, he was called to represent Krzeminski, but was not asked who 
called him on either direct or cross examination.43   
 Oliver, Knight, and Coveny all submitted memos dated February 10, 2015 to Ferro 
describing their interaction with Maltese before and during Hassett’s questioning.  DOCCS 
thereafter filed disciplinary charges against Maltese arising out of these events seeking a 
thirty-day suspension without pay.44  The disciplinary charges were subsequently 
withdrawn by DOCCS, as were internal NYSCOPBA ethics charges against Oliver and 
Knight.45 
DISCUSSION 
 Section 209-a.1(g) provides that it is an improper practice for an employer:  
to fail to permit or refuse to afford a public employee the 
right, upon the employee's demand, to representation by a 
representative of the employee organization, or the designee 
of such organization, which has been certified or recognized 
under this article when at the time of questioning by the 
employer of such employee it reasonably appears that he or 
she may be the subject of a potential disciplinary action. If 
representation is requested, and the employee is a potential 
target of disciplinary action at the time of questioning, a 
reasonable period of time shall be afforded to the employee 
to obtain such representation. It shall be an affirmative 
defense to any improper practice charge under paragraph 
(g) of this subdivision that the employee has the right, 
pursuant to statute, interest arbitration award, collectively 
negotiated agreement, policy or practice, to present to a 
                                                     
41 Tr, pp.107, 128. 
42 Tr, p. 35. 
43 Tr, pp. 68, 70-78. 
44 Respondent Ex 1. 
45 Tr, pp. 40-41. 
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hearing officer or arbitrator evidence of the employer's failure 
to provide representation and to obtain exclusion of the 
resulting evidence upon demonstration of such failure. 
Nothing in this section shall grant an employee any right to 
representation by the representative of an employee 
organization in any criminal investigation.  
 
 As a threshold matter, we note that probationary employees such as Hassett are fully 
covered by § 209-a.1(g) of the Act.46  Indeed, the State expressly acknowledges this to be 
the case, but, according to the testimony of both Maltese and Hassett, the investigators 
informed them that Hassett was not entitled to representation at the interview “because of 
her probationary status.”47  This belies the State’s contention that “[i]t is undisputed that 
before the questioning began, Oliver explained three or four times that she was not the 
target or subject of the investigation, she was only a witness, and if at any time that were 
to change, they would stop and get her union representation.”48  Rather, the ALJ had to 
determine whether Maltese’s and Hassett’s testimony on this point was more credible than 
that of Knight and Oliver, upon which the State relies.49   
 While Hassett and Maltese testified unequivocally, Knight and Oliver each authored a 
memorandum stating that Hassett was denied representation mentioning both her status 
as a probationary employee and her status as a witness.50  The ALJ credited Maltese and 
Hasset over Knight and Oliver, in part because Knight and Oliver in their memoranda refer 
to Hassett’s probationary status as part of their explanations of the denial of 
                                                     
46 State of New York (Department of Correctional Services), 43 PERB ¶ 3031, 3119-3120 
(2010); State of New York (Department of Correctional Services), 43 PERB ¶ 3039, 3149, 
n. 2 (2010). 
47 Tr, pp. 31 (Maltese), 49 (Hassett).   
48 Brief in Support of Exceptions at 20. 
49 Coveny, although present for the interview, did not offer any testimony as to the grounds 
upon which representation was denied Hassett.  Tr, pp. 132, 134-135.  
50 Respondent Ex 3 (Knight) (representation was denied because “she was a probationary 
employee and not suspected of any misconduct”); see also Respondent Ex 2 (Oliver) 
(“she was a probationary employee who [] is only a witness to the alleged incident”). 
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representation.   
 The Board has long held that “[c]redibility determinations by an ALJ are generally 
entitled to ‘great weight unless there is objective evidence in the record compelling a 
conclusion that the credibility finding is manifestly incorrect.’”51  Here, the State simply 
asserts that its witnesses are credible; no objective reason compelling a conclusion that 
the ALJ’s finding them not to be on this point has been adduced.  Indeed, the State does 
not even address the contrary testimony of Hassett and Maltese on this issue, incorrectly 
characterizing the issue as “undisputed.” 
 The State correctly contends that the ALJ’s finding that Hassett and Maltese were 
told that she was not entitled to representation because she was a probationary employee 
does not of its own weight establish that it reasonably appeared at the time of questioning 
that Hassett might be the subject of a potential disciplinary action.  However, we find that 
the ALJ did not err in finding it to be a relevant fact under the circumstances. 
 In State of New York (Department of Correctional Services), the Board explained 
that, in determining whether, at the time of questioning, it reasonably appeared that an 
employee was the potential subject or target of disciplinary action, as required to invoke 
the protections of § 209-a.1(g) of the Act: 
we consider the totality of the circumstances including the 
reasonableness of the employee's subjective perception, 
which may have precipitated the request for representation. 
Although an employee's perceptions are relevant to our 
                                                     
51 Village of Scarsdale, 50 PERB ¶ 3007, n. 51 (2017), quoting Village of Endicott, 47 
PERB ¶ 3017, 3051 (2014) (quoting Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶ 3005, at 
3019, confirmed and modified in part sub nom Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v NYS Pub 
Empl Relations Bd, 61 AD3d 1231, 42 PERB ¶ 7004 (3d Dept 2009), on remittitur, 42 
PERB ¶ 3016 (2009), quoting County of Nassau, 24 PERB ¶ 3029 (1991); see also 
County of Tioga, 44 PERB ¶ 3016, at 3062; Mount Morris Cent Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶ 3020 
(2008); City of Rochester, 23 PERB ¶ 3049 (1990); Hempstead Housing Auth, 12 PERB   
¶ 3054 (1979); Captain's Endowment Assn, 10 PERB ¶ 3034 (1977)). 
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inquiry, our primary focus is on objective facts in the record. 
Those facts include: the subject matter and context of the 
questioning; the verbal and written statements by the 
employer prior to the questioning; the verbal exchange 
between the employer representative and the employee; the 
timing and venue of the questioning; and the treatment of 
other employees similarly situated.52 
 
   Here, several factors support the ALJ’s finding that it reasonably appeared that 
Hassett was the potential subject or target of disciplinary action.  The most significant 
factor, upon our review of the evidence, is that, as Hassett testified, she was concerned 
that, by not filing a report regarding the mess hall incident, she might have violated 
departmental rules requiring her to report workplace violence.  The fact that the incident 
under investigation was the very one she had failed to report, quite reasonably would 
exacerbate that concern, as the lack of a report from her was self-evident—indeed, the 
State itself remarks that “Hassett had not submitted any ‘to/from’ memo about the 
incident.”53  This evidence establishes that Hassett “may have violated the mandates of 
the [DOCCS] employee manual, which would render [her] a potential subject or target of 
discipline.” 54 
 In this context, the fact that the ALJ did not credit Knight’s and Oliver’s testimony that 
Hassett was repeatedly told that she was being questioned only as a witness, and 
therefore not entitled to representation, bears on the totality of the circumstances in two 
different respects.  First, a contrary finding would have by its very nature assuaged, at 
least to some extent, Hassett’s objectively reasonable perception that she might be a 
potential subject of discipline.  Second, as the ALJ found, based on Hassett’s unrebutted 
                                                     
52 43 PERB ¶ 3031 at 3121; see also State of New York (Dept of Corr Svcs), 43 PERB       
¶ 3039, 3146 (2010). 
53 Brief in Support of Exceptions at 18. 
54 State of New York (Dept of Corr Svcs), 43 PERB ¶ 3031, at 3121 (finding such evidence 
sufficient to establish right to representation).  
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testimony, the “verbal exchange between Hassett and the investigators included a 
reference to Hassett’s probationary status along with the statement that Hassett’s answers 
could result in termination without the need for the contractual disciplinary process.”55  In 
the context of this case, such a statement could only exacerbate Hassett’s concerns that 
she was potentially subject to discipline.  
 Likewise, we do not find credible the State’s argument that the presence of Deputy 
Superintendent Coveny at what was purportedly a routine interview of a witness in an 
almost concluded investigation would reasonably be perceived as intended “to assure that 
she [Hassett] was comfortable during the questioning.”56  Indeed, for a probationary 
employee to be confronted by a Senior Investigator, the Deputy Superintendent for 
Security of the Facility, and an Assistant Deputy Chief suggests a rather more ominous 
context than the benign atmosphere of reassurance the State suggests.  This is especially 
so when she is reminded that her employment can be terminated without recourse to any 
contractual process, and has reason to believe that she might well have in fact violated of 
DOCCS policy with respect to the very incident in question.      
 In addition, the fact that Hassett was not interviewed with the other officers at the 
facility on January 28, but was to be interviewed at DOCCS headquarters in Albany 
tended to single her out.  While Oliver had informed Maltese that the reason for this 
                                                     
55 48 PERB ¶ 4602, at 4870; see Tr, p. 55 (Hassett).  The State claims that this testimony 
was controverted by Knight.  (Brief in Support of Exceptions at 16, citing Tr, p. 127).  
Knight’s cited testimony comprises his statement that he “was trying to let [Maltese] know 
that it wasn’t because she was probationary.  It was because she was only a witness that 
she was not being afforded the union representation.”  Tr, p. 127.  However, as noted 
above, this testimony was not deemed credible by the ALJ, and no objective grounds 
compelling a finding that the ALJ manifestly erred in this determination has been adduced.  
More to the point, Knight’s testimony of what he told Maltese is in no way inconsistent with 
Hassett’s testimony that she was told by the investigators that “if they wanted me gone . . . 
They would just fire me.”      
56 Brief in Support of Exceptions at 9. 
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treatment was that Hassett was a probationary employee, Maltese was himself skeptical of 
this, and the record does not reflect that he communicated this reasoning to her.  Rather, 
she testified that she interpreted the summons to Albany as suggestive that she might be 
in trouble—a reading consistent with that of Maltese, though the record does not establish 
that he communicated his view on that matter to her either.   
 In sum, although the ALJ could have been more explicit about the basis of her 
findings, we find that her credibility determination was not an abuse of discretion, and that 
the record as a whole supports the finding that, at the interview on February 10, 2014, it 
reasonably appeared that Hassett might have been the subject of potential disciplinary 
action, and we therefore affirm the ALJ’s finding that DOCCS violated § 209-a.1(g) of the 
Act by refusing to allow Hassett union representation at the investigatory interview.   
 The State’s third exception, to the remedy ordered by the ALJ, is likewise unavailing. 
The State contends that the only appropriate remedy for a violation of § 209-a.1(g) of the 
Act is exclusion at any disciplinary hearing of any statements made by an unrepresented 
employee whose right to representation was violated, an argument based on language in 
§ 209-a.1(g) providing that: 
It shall be an affirmative defense to any improper practice 
charge under paragraph (g) of this subdivision that the 
employee has the right, pursuant to statute, interest 
arbitration award, collectively negotiated agreement, policy 
or practice, to present to a hearing officer or arbitrator 
evidence of the employer's failure to provide representation 
and to obtain exclusion of the resulting evidence upon 
demonstration of such failure. 
  
In effect, the State argues that the only available remedy for a violation of § 209-
a.1(g) of the Act is to treat the violation as if the employer had established that it had not 
violated the Act at all, by proving the affirmative defense which it has signally failed to 
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do.57  Merely “[t]o state the argument is to refute it”58; the whole point of a proven 
affirmative defense is that the respondent has established compliance with the Act’s 
mandates. The notion that a violation of the Act should be treated on par with compliance 
with the Act is not only absurd but would create a perverse incentive encouraging 
violations.   
Nor has the State pointed to anything in the language of the statute that limits the 
Board’s remedial authority in the context of a § 209-a.1(g) violation.  The State’s reliance 
on then-Governor Eliot Spitzer’s message approving the bill does not support its 
contention.  The relied-upon text of the message refers to a context in which the 
affirmative defense has been established, and concludes that, when such is the case, 
“there can be no improper practice charge,” and thus no “two bites at the apple” for the 
employee to seek exclusion of her testimony.59  The State draws its quotation not directly 
from the source, but from the Board’s decision in State of New York (DOCCS), without 
addressing that decision’s express rejection of the very arguments it makes here, and 
approval of the almost identical remedy the ALJ ordered in this case.60  Nor does it 
address the Board’s rejection of its arguments against the applicability of the general 
principles of make whole relief to violations of §209.a-1(g) in that case as well as in State 
                                                     
57 Indeed, already noted at n. 1, ante, the State did not except to the ALJ’s finding that the 
affirmative defense had not  been established, as Hassett’s probationary status denied her 
the benefit of the section of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement relied upon to 
establish the defense, the merits of which are not before us. 
58 See United States v Ford, 279 Fed Appx 68, 70 (2d Cir 2008). 
59 2 MCKINNEY’S 2007 SESSION LAWS OF NEW YORK, Approval Message No 10 (July 18, 
2017) (approving L 2007, ch 244) at 1498.  
60 43 PERB ¶ 3031, at 3117, 3122-3123. 
of New York (DOCCS).61  As both those cases demonstrate, “[p]ursuant to § 205.5(d) of 
the Act, PERB is granted broad remedial make-whole authority to order a party to cease 
and desist from engaging in an improper practice, and to order such affirmative action that 
will effectuate the policies of the Act.”62  In just such a case as this, involving the same 
parties, the Board has ordered: 
 [T]he State to immediately remove and destroy all 
documents maintained by the State, including documents in 
DOCS personnel records, [the employee’s] personnel history 
folder, and in DOCS OIG's investigatory notes, memoranda, 
email, and reports, which may contain information that was 
obtained during the [date] questioning of [the employee] 
without representation.63  
 
The State argues that the remedy here is unduly burdensome, but does not specify 
any specific difficulty or cost in locating or destroying any notes or documents 
memorializing Hassett’s statements in her unrepresented interview.  Nor does the State 
claim that Hassett’s testimony was of such paramount importance that its destruction 
would impair DOCCS’s functionality such that the remedy is grossly disproportionate to the 
impact on the agency.  To the contrary, the State contends that Hassett’s answers were 
anodyne, acknowledging that “Oliver did not use any of the information he got from 
Hassett, since she said she did not see anything.”64  A remedy has been found to be 
unduly burdensome where the remedy ordered imposes a grossly disproportionate cost, or 
the status quo ante cannot be restored due to subsequent events.65  No such claim has 
been made here, and, indeed, none seems possible on these facts.  Thus, no reason has 
                                                     
61 43 PERB ¶ 3039, at 3147-3148 (rejecting claims that back pay was inappropriate 
remedy for probationary employee based on his statements given without union 
representation in violation of the Act). 
62 State of New York (Dept of Corr Svcs), 43 PERB ¶ 3031, at 3122.  See generally City of 
New York v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 103 AD3d 145, 149 (3d Dept 2012); City of 
Albany v Helsby, 29 NY2d 433, 439 (1972) (“The remedies for improper employer 
practices are peculiarly matters within administrative competence”).  
63 Id. at 3123. 
64 Brief in Support of Exceptions at 20. 
65 See, eg, Town of Islip v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 23 NY3d 482, 494 (2014); 
Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v NYS Pub Emp Relations Bd, 61 AD3d 1231, 1234–1235 
(3d Dept 2009). 
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been suggested that would justify our not providing full relief by restoring the status quo 
ante, and affirming the ALJ’s remedial order.  We therefore deny the State’s third 
exception, and affirm the ALJ’s remedial order as to the violation of Hassett’s right to union 
representation at the disciplinary interview. 
Finally, we turn to the State’s second exception, its contention that the ALJ erred in 
finding that the State violated § 209-a.1(a) and (b) of the Act by “selecting” Helmicki as the 
union representative at Krzeminski’s interview.  Under the unusual circumstances 
presented here, we find that the ALJ erred in finding that the State in any meaningful way 
“selected” Hekmicki to represent Krzeminski, and that it interfered with protected rights 
under the Act. 
Section 209-a.1(a) defines as an improper practice “for a public employer or its 
agents deliberately to interfere with, restrain or coerce public employees in the exercise of 
their rights guaranteed in section two hundred two for the purpose of depriving them of 
such rights.”  It is well established that § 209-a.1(a) of the Act “broadly and generally 
prohibits employer actions which interfere with respect to any issue affecting their 
employment relationship, whether or not that subject embraces a mandatory subject of 
negotiation.”66  That “request for and receipt of union representation constitutes 
participation in a union, a right specifically protected by § 202 of the Act” is likewise well 
established.67   
Section 209-a.1(b) of the Act similarly declares it improper for a “public employer or 
its agents deliberately to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any 
employee organization for the purpose of depriving [public employees] of [their rights 
                                                     
66 City of Buffalo, 30 PERB ¶ 3021, 3048 (1997); see also Brunswick Cent Sch Dist, 19 
PERB ¶ 3063, 3126 (1986). 
67 Id. 
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guaranteed in § 202].”68  The Board has long held that the term “interference” in 
subsection (b) is “designed to prevent a public employer from meddling in the internal 
affairs of the organization or trying to control it.”69  Moreover, the Board has made clear 
that the prohibition in § 209-a.1(b) “is directed to conduct by a public employer which 
would compromise the independence of an employee organization that represents or 
seeks to represent its employees.”70   
The Board’s precedents establish “either party to a bargaining relationship may 
choose its own representatives and neither may attempt to control the other’s selection.”71   
Thus, “under ordinary circumstances, an attempt by one party to control the selection of 
the other party’s representative might constitute a violation of the Act.”72  Indeed, we would 
go further and say that such an attempt, successful or not, generally would constitute a 
violation, to remove any ambiguity created by the Board’s use of “might” in County of 
Onadonga.  However, we do not agree that the evidence establishes that DOCCS 
selected Helmicki as Krzeminski’s union representative.   
As a threshold matter, in an improper practice case, “the burden of proof at all times 
rests with the charging party to prove all [requisite] elements by a preponderance of the 
                                                     
68 Monroe BOCES No. 1, 28 PERB ¶ 3068, 3157 (1995). 
69 County of Rockland (Rockland County Community College), 13 PERB ¶ 3089, 3143 
(1980). 
70 County of Onondaga, 14 PERB ¶ 3029, 3051 (1981).  While a violation of this section 
does not require a finding of anti-union animus, or specific motive, evidence must be 
adduced of circumstances in which the employer’s actions necessarily have the effect of 
interfering with fundamental rights.  Monroe BOCES No. 1, 28 PERB ¶ 3068, at 3158. 
71 Erie County Water Auth, 25 PERB ¶ 3030, 3063 (1992); Village of Malone, 23 PERB     
¶ 3019, 3036 (1990); City of Newburgh, 16 PERB ¶ 3081 (1983).   
72 Village of Malone, 23 PERB ¶ 3019, at 3036 (finding no violation where union had 
waived by express contractual provision right to select member on grievance board). 
evidence.”73  Here, the ALJ’s conclusion that NYSCOPBA proved that DOCCS “selected” 
Helmicki rests solely on Maltese’s testimony that he did not himself place the call.  In view 
of Krzeminski’s testimony that either Maltese or a sergeant placed the call and giving the 
lack of any other proof regarding who placed the call, we find that NYSCOPBA failed to 
establish the elements of the charge.  
Accordingly, we affirm the ALJ’s decision holding that DOCCS’s denial of Hassett’s 
request for representation at the interview on February 10, 2014, affirm the ALJ’s remedial 
order for that violation, and reverse the ALJ’s finding that DOCCS’ selection of Helmicki as 
a replacement for Maltese constituted interference in violation of §§209-a.1(a) and (b) of 
the Act. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the State forthwith: 
1.  Permit, upon the employee’s demand, representation for a DOCCS employee in 
the NYSCOPBA represented unit when at the time of questioning it reasonably appears 
that he or she may be the subject or target of potential disciplinary action; 
2.  Immediately remove and destroy all documents maintained by the State, 
including documents in DOCCS personnel records, correction officer Nicole Hassett’s 
personnel records, and in DOCCS OSI’s investigatory notes, memoranda, email, and 
reports which may contain information that was obtained during the February 10, 2014 
questioning of Hassett without representation; 
3.  Not use, in the context of Nicole Hassett’s State employment, any information 
obtained during the February 10, 2014 interview; and  
                                                     
73 Catskill Housing Authority (Biegel), 49 PERB ¶ 3025 (2016) (charge under § 209-a.1(a) 
and (c)); City Sch Dist of the City of Buffalo, 48 PERB ¶ 3001, (2015) (dismissing charge 
under § 209-a.1(b) where charging party’s evidence could not reasonably support 
inference of intention to interfere on the part of the public employer); NYCTA (Andre), 32 
PERB ¶ 3061 (1999) (charge under § 209-a.1(a) and (b)). 
4.  Sign and post notice in the form attached at all physical and electronic locations 
customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
DATED:  November 6, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
     
 
 
  
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
 
we hereby notify all employees of State of New York (Department of 
Corrections and Community Supervision) in the unit represented by the New York 
State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association, Inc. that the State 
of New York (Department of Corrections and Community Supervision) will:  
 
1.  Permit, upon the employee’s demand, representation for a State of New York 
(Department of Corrections and Community Supervision) (DOCCS) employee in the 
NYSCOPBA represented unit when at the time of questioning it reasonably appears 
that he or she may be the subject or target of potential disciplinary action; 
 
2.  Immediately remove and destroy all documents maintained by the State, including 
documents in DOCCS personnel records, correction officer Nicole Hassett’s personnel 
records, and in DOCCS OSI’s investigatory notes, memoranda, email, and reports which 
may contain information that was obtained during the February 10, 2014 questioning of 
Hassett without representation; and 
 
3.  Not use, in the context of Nicole Hassett’s State employment, any information obtained 
at the February 10, 2014 interview. 
 
 
Dated . . . . . . . . . .  By  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
 on behalf of the State of New York  
 (Department of Corrections and Community Supervision)   
                                                                
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be 
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
 
           STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
_________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
 
Charging Party         CASE NO. U-32543 
- and - 
 
STATE OF NEW YORK (OFFICE OF 
MENTAL HEALTH – ROCHESTER PSYCHIATRIC CENTER), 
 
Respondent. 
_________________________________________ 
 
BRUCE D. SMITH, for Charging Party 
 
MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE, GENERAL COUNSEL (CLAY J. LODOVICE of 
counsel), for Respondent 
 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (Office of 
Mental Health – Rochester Psychiatric Center) (State or RPC) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the State violated § 209-a.1(d) of the Public 
Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when, on December 13, 2012, the State 
unilaterally imposed a new sick leave usage procedure applicable to employees 
represented by the New York State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF).1  
The new procedure requires the represented employees to submit a doctor’s certificate 
for unscheduled use of sick leave surrounding the 2012-2013 Christmas and New 
Year’s holidays.  The ALJ ordered the State to cease and desist from implementing the 
                                            
1 48 PERB ¶ 4610 (2015).  
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new requirement, to make whole affected unit employees, and to post a notice. 
EXCEPTIONS 
 The State excepts to the ALJ’s decision on four main grounds.  The State argues 
that language in the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) provides PEF with 
an arguable source of right with respect to documentation requirements for the use of 
sick leave, thus depriving the Board of jurisdiction over the current dispute.  In the 
alternative, the State argues that the Board should defer to the parties’ agreed-upon 
dispute resolution procedures and conditionally dismiss this proceeding.  The State 
further argues that it has satisfied any duty to negotiate over sick leave documentation 
requirements.  Finally, the State argues that PEF failed to establish an enforceable past 
practice and that PEF consequently has failed to support its allegation that a change 
actually occurred.   
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ’s decision. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ’s decision and are discussed here only as 
far as is necessary to address the exceptions. 
 At the time the charge was filed, PEF and the State were parties to a CBA running 
for the term of April 2, 2011 through April 1, 2015.2 
 On December 13, 2012, Christopher Kirisits, the Director of Nursing at RPC, sent an 
email to the entire RPC nursing staff, including those represented by PEF, advising them, 
in relevant part, that: 
                                            
2 Joint Ex 1. 
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[l]ast minute call [ins] will require documentation supporting 
the rational (sic) for the absence …[b]eginning 7:00 am 
Monday December 24th, 2012… [e]nding 7:00 am 
Wednesday December 26th, 2012… &…[b]eginning 7:00 am 
Monday December 31st, 2012…[e]nding 7:00 am 
Wednesday January 2nd, 2013.3 
 
Lisa Couperus, PEF’s Chief Steward at the time of the events, and other union officials 
informed Kirisits of PEF’s opposition to his order immediately after it was published.4   
 Since November 1982, RPC has had a policy in place concerning “Submission of 
Doctor’s Certificate(s) [f]or absences due to illness/injury.”5  In relevant part, the policy 
states: 
It is the policy of Rochester Psychiatric Center not to 
routinely require an employee to submit a doctor’s certificate 
for each instance of unscheduled absence. However, 
management will require that a doctor’s certificate be 
submitted under the following circumstances: 
 
1) Occupational injury leave or workers’ compensation leave 
2) Sick leave with half pay 
3) Sick leave without pay 
4) Leave for maternity/child rearing purposes 
5) Extended illness of more than four (4) consecutive work 
days 
6) Medical restrictions that affect performance of duties 
 
Management may also require employees who have been 
identified as abusers of time and attendance standards to 
submit a doctor’s certificate for each instance of 
unscheduled absence. In such instances, the employee will 
be given advance notice that for a specified period of time 
(not to exceed six months), a doctor’s certificate will be 
required and failure to provide a doctor’s certificate will result 
in a loss of pay.6  
   
 Karen Spotford, PEF’s Chief Steward from Spring 2003 to November 29, 2012, 
                                            
3 Joint Ex 2. 
4 See separate correspondence dated December 14, 17 and 24, 2012 (Joint Exs 3-5). 
5 Policy and Procedure #1520, Joint Ex 6. 
6 Id. emphasis in original. 
Case No. U-32543  -4- 
 
testified that during her entire tenure as Chief Steward, RPC followed the foregoing 
policy as written and never required any employees to provide a doctor’s certificate for 
their absence outside the specific circumstances set forth in the policy.   
 Article 45 of the parties’ CBA, entitled “BENEFITS GUARANTEED,” states: 
With respect to matters not covered by this Agreement, the 
State will not seek to diminish or impair during the term of 
this Agreement any benefit or privilege provided by law, rule 
or regulation for employees without prior notice to PEF; and, 
when appropriate, without negotiations with PEF; provided, 
however, that this Agreement shall be construed consistently 
with the free exercise of rights reserved to the State by the 
Management Rights Article of this Agreement.7 
  
Article 12 of the CBA contains attendance and leave provisions related to sick 
leave.  Section 12.8, Sick Leave Accumulation, states: 
(a) Sick Leave shall be credited in accordance with the New 
York State Attendance Rules. 
(b) Employees who are entitled to earn and accumulate sick 
leave credits may accumulate such credits up to a total of 200 days.  
Employees shall have the opportunity to use up to a total of 200 days 
for retirement service credit.  Employees shall have the ability to use 
up to 200 days of such credits to pay for health insurance in 
retirement.8 
 
Section 12.9, Use of Sick Leave, states:  
 
(a)  Sick leave credits may be used for scheduled medical or dental                                                            
appointments with the advance approval of the appointing authority 
or the authority’s designee. 
(b)  Sick leave credits may be used in such units of time as the appointing      
      authority may approve, but the appointing authority shall not require 
      that sick leave credits be used in units greater than one-quarter hour.9 
    
 The New York State Civil Service Commission promulgates various rules and 
regulations that govern state civil service, codified in New York Code, Rules and 
                                            
7 Joint Ex 1, at p. 85.  
8 Id. at p. 36.  
9 Id. at pp. 36-37. 
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Regulations (NYCRR).  As relevant here, Title 4, Chapter II, Article 1, Parts 20-26, of 
NYCRR covers “Attendance for Nonmanagerial/Confidential Employees in New York 
State Departments and Institutions.”  Part 21, titled “Absence with Pay”, contains § 21.3 
titled “Sick leave.”10  Rule 21.3 contains subsections (b) and (d).11  Subsection (b) of 
Rule 21.3 addresses sick leave accumulation while subsection (d) thereof addresses 
sick leave usage including related “proof of illness” requirements. The full text of those 
subsections are as follows:12 
(b) Employees shall earn sick leave credits at the rate of 
one-half day per biweekly pay period and may accumulate 
such credits up to a total of 150 days; provided, however, 
that an employee shall not earn sick leave credit for any 
biweekly pay period unless he is in full pay status for at least 
seven work days during such biweekly pay period.  A part-
time employee who is required to work a fixed number of 
hours, five days per week, shall also earn sick leave credit 
as provided herein, but his total pay when absent on such 
leave shall be the amount which would have been due him 
had he been working regularly at his usual hours for such 
period. 
 
(d) Before absence for personal illness may be charged 
against accumulated sick leave credits, the appointing 
authority may require such proof of illness as may be 
satisfactory to it, or may require the employee to be 
examined, at the expense of the department or agency, by a 
physician designated by the appointing authority.  In the 
event of failure to submit proof of illness upon request, or in 
the event that, upon such proof as is submitted of illness 
sufficient to justify the employee’s absence from the 
performance of his duties, such absence may be considered 
as unauthorized leave and shall not be charged against 
accumulated sick leave credits.  Abuse of sick leave 
privileges shall be cause for disciplinary action. 
 
                                            
10 4 NYCRR § 21.3 (hereinafter referred to as “Rule 21.3”). 
11 Id. 
12 Respondent’s Ex 5. 
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DISCUSSION 
Deferral Issues 
We first address the State’s argument that the charge should be deferred to the 
dispute resolution procedures contained in the CBA and conditionally dismissed 
because the underlying dispute here raises contractual questions arguably beyond our 
jurisdiction.13  Specifically, the State argues that Article 12.8 of the CBA incorporates all 
of the provisions of Rule 21.3, including Rule 21.3(d), which states that “the appointing 
authority may require such proof of illness as may be satisfactory to it.”  The State 
asserts that because all of the provisions of Rule 21.3 have been incorporated into the 
CBA, any alleged violations of the Rules can be challenged through the grievance-
arbitration provisions of the CBA.  The State therefore argues that the CBA provides 
PEF with a reasonably arguable source of right with respect to the subject of the 
improper practice charge.   
We, like the ALJ, find this argument unpersuasive.  The CBA does not expressly 
incorporate Rule 21.3, in whole or in part.  Rather Article 12.8(a) of the CBA, contained 
in a section entitled “Sick Leave Accumulation,” says that “Sick leave shall be credited 
in accordance with the New York State Attendance Rules.”  Contrary to the State’s 
argument, this single reference to the Rules is not sufficient to incorporate all of the 
provisions of the Rule into the CBA.  Instead, the context of the reference (a sentence 
referring to how sick leave will be credited, in a section dealing with sick leave 
accumulation), makes it clear that the parties intended to reference only those portions 
of the Rules that relate to how employees earn sick leave time.  Rule 21.3(d), 
                                            
13 Herkimer County BOCES, 20 PERB ¶ 3050, 3109 (1987); Town of Carmel, 29 PERB 
¶ 3073, 3174-3175 (1996); County of Livingston, 30 PERB ¶ 3046, 3106 (1997).  
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addressing requirements to be met before sick leave absences are charged against sick 
leave credits, is not such a provision.14   
Moreover, as the argument is presented by the State, Article 12.8 would give a 
source of right not to PEF, but to the State itself.  That is, the State argues that Article 
12.8 gives it a right to require documentation of sick leave use by employees, not that it 
gives PEF a right to place limitations on the State’s ability to request such 
documentation.  However, “if an agreement is a source of right to the employer, an 
issue of a waiver of the right to negotiate is presented,” or one of duty satisfaction.15  
Such arguments “concern the merits of the charge, not jurisdiction.”16   
In sum, we agree with the ALJ that the reference to the Rules in the CBA does 
not give PEF a reasonably arguable contractual source of right to challenge the State’s 
action through a grievance.  
The State also argues that, even if Rule 21.3 is not fully incorporated into the 
CBA, Article 45 of the CBA nevertheless mandates jurisdictional deferral because PEF 
could challenge the State’s actions via a grievance alleging a violation of Article 45. 
Article 45 is entitled “BENEFITS GUARANTEED” and states, in relevant part:  
With respect to matters not covered by this Agreement, the 
State will not seek to diminish or impair during the term of 
this Agreement any benefits or privilege provided by law, 
rule or regulation for employees without prior notice to PEF; 
                                            
14 If the parties intended to incorporate the Rules relating to how sick leave absences 
would be charged to employees, one might expect them to have referenced such Rules 
in the next provision of the CBA, Article 12.9, entitled “Use of Sick Leave.”  Article 12.9, 
however, contains no reference to the Rules.  
15 City of New Rochelle, 44 PERB ¶ 3002, 3026 (2011), quoting County of Nassau, 23 
PERB ¶ 3051, 3108 (1990). 
16Id; see also State of New York (Unified Court System), 25 PERB ¶ 3035, 3073 (1992); 
County of Livingston, 30 PERB ¶ 3046, 3106 (1997).   See also County of Nassau, 23 
PERB ¶ 3051, at 3108. 
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and, when appropriate, without negotiations with PEF . . . .17 
 
Article 45 is similar to a “maintenance of benefits” clause.18  “Maintenance of 
benefits” clauses give rise to rights that “parallel” the statutory right to the maintenance 
of noncontractual practices.19  “The contractual right, however, does not extinguish the 
statutory right,” and we retain jurisdiction over the proceeding.20  Thus, a jurisdictional 
deferral is not warranted.  Nevertheless, deferral to the grievance-arbitration procedures 
agreed to by the parties may still be appropriate under the Board’s merits deferral 
policy.21   
In that regard, the ALJ made no finding on whether the statutory right to the 
maintenance of past practices was included in Article 45’s protection of benefits and 
privileges “provided by law, rule or regulation.”  The Board has previously had occasion 
to examine this exact language in State of New York (Workers’ Compensation Board).22  
In that case, the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
found that a substantively identical “Benefits Guaranteed” clause gave the union a 
reasonably arguable source of right with respect to the employer’s unilateral change to 
                                            
17 Joint Ex 1, at p. 85.  
18 Although Article 45 appears to protect a narrower set of noncontractual terms and 
conditions of employment from change.  Typical “maintenance of benefits” clauses 
prohibit an employer from changing any non-contractual terms and conditions of 
employment without notice to and bargaining with the certified employee representative, 
while Article 45 only prohibits the State from unilaterally altering any non-contractual 
“benefit or privilege provided by law, rule or regulation . . . .”  
19 City of Buffalo (Fire Department), 17 PERB ¶ 3090, 3138 (1984).  
20 Id.  
21 A merits deferral is appropriate when PERB has jurisdiction over a charge's 
allegation, but resolution of the charge necessitates “an interpretation of an agreement 
which is arguably a source of right to the charging party, and an award rendered under 
a binding grievance arbitration procedure is potentially dispositive of the issues 
underlying the charge.”  See Town of Carmel, 29 PERB ¶ 3073, at 3175. 
22 32 PERB ¶ 3017, 3031 (1999), on remand 32 PERB ¶ 4597; 32 PERB ¶ 3076 (1999).   
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an existing practice.  The Director concluded that the union’s right under the Act to 
negotiate terms and conditions of employment before any changes to those terms and 
conditions are made is arguably “a benefit or privilege provided by law” within the 
meaning of the “Benefits Guaranteed” clause.  Under that interpretation of the “Benefits 
Guaranteed” clause, the Director found that deferral was appropriate because a 
grievance would be potentially dispositive of the charges.23 
On review, the Board made no finding on whether the “Benefits Guaranteed” 
clause included rights protected by the Act.  Instead, it remanded the matter to the 
Director so that the parties could provide clarifying arbitration awards or judicial 
decisions regarding the applicability of the “Benefits Guaranteed” provision to the 
change at issue.  The Board reasoned that “our deferral policies, whether jurisdictional 
or merits, hinge ultimately on whether the parties’ agreement reasonably afford a 
charging party rights with respect to the subject matter of the improper practice charge . 
. .  Deferral to the parties' grievance arbitration procedure obviously is not appropriate if 
[the “Benefits Guaranteed” clause] is not applicable to the State's alleged unilateral 
rescission of this particular benefit.24   
 As in Workers’ Compensation Board, the issue of whether the language in Article 
45 encompasses the State’s duty under the Act to negotiate before making changes to 
non-contractual terms and conditions of employment was not a focus of the parties’ 
                                            
23 31 PERB ¶ 4572, 4688 (1998).  
24 After the remand, the parties submitted to the Director a Stipulation of Interpretation in 
which they agreed that the rights accorded by § 209-a.1 of the Act are not employee 
benefits provided by law, rule, or regulation within the meaning of Article 39.  32 PERB 
¶ 4597, 4856 (1999).   
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arguments at the hearing or in the post-hearing briefs.25  Also like Workers’ 
Compensation Board, we make no finding on whether Article 45 encompasses the 
rights and duties contained in the Act.  Unlike the prior Board, however, we find it 
unnecessary to remand for further evidence regarding Article 45 because we find it 
proper to exercise jurisdiction here in either event.  
First, if the laws, rules, and regulations referenced in Article 45 do not include 
Taylor Law obligations, there is no basis to find that PEF has an arguable source of 
right in the CBA.  If a charging party is without reasonably arguable rights under an 
agreement, there can be no violation of that agreement, and the pursuit of a grievance 
would be to no end.  Thus, there would be no basis on which to defer.26 
Second, if Article 45 does require the State to fulfill its Taylor Law duty to 
negotiate before making changes to non-contractual terms and conditions of 
employment, Article 45 becomes the equivalent of a “maintenance of benefits” clause.  
As discussed above, such clauses give rise to rights that parallel, but do not extinguish, 
PERB’s jurisdiction to determine the statutory rights.  Therefore, while a merits deferral 
might have been appropriate, there is no basis for arguing that the Board is deprived of 
jurisdiction under § 205.5(d) of the Act.   
 As explained above, a merits deferral may still be appropriate in proceedings that 
                                            
25 Although the State did not squarely raise this issue before the ALJ and therefore 
could be found to have waived this argument, it is PERB’s “right and responsibility . . . to 
ensure that the deferral policies we have fashioned to give effect to the Legislature’s 
intent are correctly applied.”  32 PERB ¶ 3017, at 3031.   
26 Id.   
allege the respondent’s actions violate a “maintenance of benefits” clause.27  A merits 
deferral is not required by the Act, however, but is, instead, a policy developed by the 
Board which is designed to further the public policy of the State to “encourage public 
employers and employee organizations to agree upon procedures for resolving 
disputes.”28  As such, the Board may, in an exercise of its discretion, retain jurisdiction 
and decide the merits of the underlying improper practice charge.29  In the current case, 
although the State interposed both a jurisdictional and a merits deferral affirmative 
defense in its answer, neither the State nor the PBA asserted to the ALJ at the hearing 
that the proceeding should be deferred.  Nor did either party file an interlocutory appeal 
to the Board from the ALJ’s failure to defer.  As a result, the merits of the improper 
practice charge were fully litigated before the ALJ, and the merits of the ALJ’s decision 
on the charge have been fully argued before us.  “Deferral would, therefore, impose 
wasteful duplication of efforts on the parties.”30  Moreover, PEF has not filed a 
grievance challenging the State’s action and, as a result, there are no grievance or 
arbitration proceedings for us to defer to.  In these circumstances, we believe that it 
would best effectuate the policies of the Act for us to decide the State’s exceptions 
regarding the merits of the charge, and we therefore decline to defer this proceeding.  
 
                                            
27 City of Buffalo, 17 PERB ¶ 3090, at 3138-3139.  We conditionally dismiss such 
charges, subject to reinstatement should the respondent interpose objections to 
arbitrability or should an arbitration award not satisfy the standards for deferral 
delineated in New York City Transit Authority (Bordansky), 4 PERB ¶ 3031 (1971).  See 
also East Meadow Union Free Sch Dist, 48 PERB ¶ 3006, 3020 (2015); County of 
Sullivan and Sullivan County Sheriff, 41 PERB ¶ 3006, 3035-3036 (2008). 
28 See § 200 of the Act; City of Buffalo, 17 PERB ¶ 3090, at 3138-3139.  
29 County of Sullivan and Sullivan County Sheriff, 41 PERB ¶ 3006, at 3035.  
30 Id, at 3036.   
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Substantive Merits 
 It is well-established that “[t]he procedures for granting and terminating sick leave 
and returning to work are mandatorily negotiable.”31  In particular, changed 
requirements for submission of medical documentation or physician’s notes are 
mandatory.32  Accordingly, the State’s decision here to require medical documentation 
constituted a violation of § 209-a.1(d) of the Act, unless one or more of the defenses 
offered by the State have merit.   
The State argues that PEF failed to show that the State had an unequivocal 
practice of not requiring sick leave documentation for one-day absences such that 
employees had a reasonable expectation that they would not be required to produce 
such documentation.33  We affirm the ALJ’s rejection of this argument.  As he found, 
RPC’s policy for submission of doctor’s certificates for absence due to illness/injury 
contemplates six specific circumstances in which the State will require medical 
documentation.34  None requires medical documentation simply based on the date of 
the absence.  The policy also provides that the State may require employees who have 
been identified as “abusers of time and attendance standards” to submit medical 
                                            
31 City of New Rochelle, 47 PERB ¶ 3004, 3011 (2014), citing Plainedge UFSD, 7 PERB 
¶ 3050 (1974); and City of Schenectady, 24 PERB ¶ 3016 (1991); see also County of 
Cortland, 48 PERB ¶ 3028, 3009 (2015); Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Auth., 27 PERB 
¶ 3076 (1994); State of New York (DOCS), 31 PERB ¶ 3065 (1998); City of New York, 
35 PERB ¶ 3034 (2002).   
32 Village of Scarsdale, 50 PERB ¶ 3007 (2017); State of New York (DOCS), 37 PERB  
¶ 3023, 3064 (2004); State of New York (DOCS), 31 PERB ¶ 3065, 3144 (1998); see 
also City of New York v Bd of Collective Bargaining, 107 AD3d 612, 612-613 (1st Dept 
2013) (upholding administrative finding that employer's unilateral requirement of a 
doctor's “fit for duty” statement following an employee’ s absence from service for three 
or more days violated the City’s duty to negotiate).  
33 County of Nassau, 24 PERB ¶ 3029, 3058 (1991); See also Chenango Forks Cent 
Sch Dist, 40 PERB ¶ 3012 (2007); City of Oswego, 41 PERB ¶ 3011, 3070 (2008). 
34 Joint Ex 6.  
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documentation for each instance of unscheduled absence.  Nowhere in the policy 
document does it state or suggest that the use of sick leave on any particular date 
constitutes abuse, and it does not support the contention that medical documentation 
will be required for single-day absences that occur on or near a holiday.  The 
enumeration of these circumstances in the policy does not suggest any additional 
circumstances in which documentary evidence of sickness would be required, and the 
document cannot reasonably be read as establishing any such circumstances.  
Likewise, the evidence before the ALJ supports his finding.  Indeed, Spotford’s 
uncontradicted testimony confirmed that the State had not required such documentation 
since at least the Spring of 2003.35  The State presented no evidence showing that it 
had ever required that medical documentation be submitted for single-day absences 
that occur on or near a holiday.  We affirm the ALJ’s finding that the evidence 
establishes that a clear practice existed whereby the State never required any 
employees to provide medical documentation for their absences outside the specific 
circumstances set forth in the policy and that employees had a reasonable expectation 
that this practice would continue.  
The State also argues that it satisfied any duty it had to negotiate over its medical 
documentation requirement by agreeing to incorporate Rule 21.3(d) into the parties’ 
CBA.  For the reasons discussed above, we reject the State’s argument that Rule 
21.3(d) has been incorporated into the CBA.  There are no contractual provisions that 
either expressly or implicitly demonstrate that the parties had reached accord on the 
                                            
35 Contrary to the State’s assertion, nothing that Spotford said during cross-examination 
contradicted her testimony that the State had never, prior to 2012, required medical 
documentation for single-day absences occurring during the Christmas and New Year’s 
holidays.  
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specific subject of medical documentation for sick leave absences, and no basis for 
finding that the specific subject had been “negotiated to fruition.”36  Therefore, we reject 
the State’s duty satisfaction defense.    
 The State additionally argues that, even if Rule 21.3 is not incorporated into the 
CBA, Rule 21.3 nevertheless applies to unit employees as a matter of law because 
there is no conflicting provision in the CBA.37  The State further argues that Rule 21.3 
authorizes it to request documentation for sick leave from unit employees.  PEF does 
not dispute that Rule 21.3 is applicable to unit employees here.   
 Rule 21.3 was promulgated in 1966 by the New York State Civil Service 
Commission,38 and, even were we to impermissibly treat it as having the equivalent 
authority of a statute and read it as broadly as the State urges, we would be compelled 
to find that the enactment of the Act rendered it invalid to the extent it conflicts with the 
Act.39  In the specific context of the Act, the Board and the Courts have found that a 
“[r]egulation does not supersede the Taylor Law duty to bargain, nor does it evidence a 
public policy which supersedes the public policy contained in the Taylor Law that 
                                            
36 County of Nassau, 48 PERB ¶ 3014, 3051 (2015), citing Orchard Park Central School 
District, 47 PERB ¶ 3029, 3089 (2014); New York City Transit Authority, 41 PERB         
¶ 3014, 3076 (2008). 
37 Rule 26.3 states that the attendance rules, “insofar as they apply to employees in the 
negotiating units established pursuant to article 14 of the Civil Service Law, shall be 
continued; provided, however, that during periods of time when there is in effect an 
agreement between the State and an employee organization reached pursuant to the 
provisions of said article 14, the provisions of such agreement and the provisions of 
such rules shall both be applicable. In the event the provisions of the agreement are 
different from the provisions of the attendance rules, the provisions of the agreement 
shall be controlling.”   
38 1966 Department of Civil Service Regulations, 4 CRR-NY 21.3 (sec amd, filed Sept 
16, 1966).   
39 See, eg, General Electric Capital Corp v NYS Div of Tax Appeals, 301 AD2d 819 (3d 
Dept 2003) (Provisions of later, more specific statute control over earlier, more general 
statute). 
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encourages collective bargaining as to terms and conditions of employment.”40  In sum, 
the obligation to bargain imposed by the Act cannot be suspended, superseded, or 
otherwise impaired by the unilateral promulgation of a regulation.   
Moreover, the Board has already twice examined the language of Rule 21.3 and 
twice rejected the State’s precise argument here.  We find that the Board’s prior 
analysis of Rule 21.3 appropriately harmonizes the Rule with the supervening passage 
of the Act, and therefore serves the policies of the Act while allowing the Rule to govern 
in circumstances that do not infringe upon mandatory subjects of bargaining.   
In State of New York (Dept of Correctional Services – Downstate Correctional 
Facility) (Downstate Correctional Facility), the Board found that Rule 21.3 does not 
excuse the State from its obligation to bargain before implementing new requirements 
for sick leave medical documentation, a mandatory subject of bargaining.41  While we 
reach the same conclusion, we do so for the additional reason that Rule 21.3 cannot 
privilege the State to disregard its obligations under the Act and to act unilaterally with  
 
 
                                            
40 Newburgh Enlarged City Sch Dist, 21 PERB ¶ 3036, 3079 (1988) (citing and quoting 
Bd.of Education of the UFSD # 3 of the Town of Huntington v Associated Teachers of 
Huntington, 30 NY2d 122, 130, 5 PERB ¶ 7507, 7510 (1972), confd sub nom Bd of 
Educ of the Newburgh Enlarged City Sch Dist v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 22 PERB 
¶ 7009 (Sup Ct Alb Co 1989).  
41 31 PERB ¶ 3065 (1998); see also State of New York (Dept of Correctional Services), 
37 PERB ¶ 3023, 3065 fn. 4 (2004).  In Downstate Correctional Facility, the State 
argued that its actions were allowed by the New York State Department of Civil Service 
Attendance and Leave Manual, a document published by the Department of Civil 
Service, rather than the rule itself.  We find this distinction to be immaterial, however, 
since the same considerations are at play here. 
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respect to changes in mandatory subjects of negotiation.42  
As the Act, a statute enacted by the Legislature, controls over a Rule 
promulgated by an Agency, such as the Civil Service Commission, we find that this 
construction of the Act in limiting the scope of the Rule is appropriate, and adhere to it.  
Thus, even if Rule 21.3 authorizes the State to request sick leave documentation, the 
State must comply with its Taylor Law obligation to bargain prior to doing so.   
Moreover, although the State disagrees with the conclusion reached by the Board in 
Downstate Correctional Facility and argues that the current matter is factually 
distinguishable, the State has presented no compelling reasons for us to revisit or 
overrule the Board’s holding.43  As a result, we find that the State is not privileged 
pursuant to Rule 21.3 to change the sick leave use procedures without negotiations with 
PEF.  
 Based on the foregoing, we find that the State violated § 209-a.1(d) of the Act 
when it unilaterally required employees to submit a doctor’s certificate for unscheduled 
absences surrounding the 2012-2013 Christmas and New Year’s holidays. 
 IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the State: 
(1) Cease and desist from requiring unit employees to submit medical 
                                            
42 See also Newburgh Enlarged City Sch Dist, 21 PERB ¶ 3036 (1988) (“Under the 
Taylor Law, the obligation to bargain as to all terms and conditions of employment is a 
broad and unqualified one, and there is no reason why the mandatory provision of that 
Act should be limited, in any way, except in cases where some other applicable 
statutory provision explicitly and definitively prohibits the public employer from making 
an agreement as to a particular term or condition of employment”), confirmed 22 PERB 
¶ 7009 (Sup Ct Albany, 1989), motion to appeal dismissed 25 PERB ¶ 7008 (3d Dept 
1992).  
43 Moreover, absent such a compelling reason to do so, we are loathe to disrupt the 
settled expectations of the parties, formed by our decisions, especially when they have 
been relied upon in entering into the collective bargaining agreement at issue here.  
See, eg, State of New York (SUNY Buffalo), 50 PERB ¶ 3001, 3004 (2017).  
Case No. U-32543  -17- 
 
documentation as a prerequisite for approving the use of accumulated sick 
leave credits for unscheduled absences of four days or less occurring during 
Christmas and New Year’s holidays, except as provided for in Rochester 
Psychiatric Center Policy and Procedure #1520; 
(2) Make unit employees whole for wages and benefits lost, if any, as a result of the 
State’s implementation of the at-issue sick leave usage policy concerning 
Christmas and New Year’s holidays, with interest at the maximum legal rate; 
and  
(3) Sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic locations       
normally used by it to post written communications to unit employees. 
DATED:  November 6, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
      
 
    
 NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
 
We hereby notify all employees of the State of New York (Office of Mental Health – 
Rochester Psychiatric Center) (State) in the bargaining unit represented by the 
New York State Public Employees Federation, AFL–CIO that the State will: 
 
1. Not require unit employees to submit medical documentation as a prerequisite 
for approving the use of accumulated sick leave credits for unscheduled 
absences of four days or less occurring during Christmas and New Year’s 
holidays, except as provided for in Rochester Psychiatric Center Policy and 
Procedure #1520; and  
   
2. Make unit employees whole for wages and benefits lost, if any, as a result of the 
State’s implementation of the at issue sick leave usage policy concerning 
Christmas and New Year’s holidays, with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
  
 
Dated . . . . . . . . . .                      By  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
on behalf of the State of York (Office                     
of Mental Health -  Rochester 
Psychiatric Center) 
                                                                                
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
 
  
  
 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
_________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
LOCAL 456, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS,  
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- and -        
 
CITY OF YONKERS, 
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MICHAEL V. CURTI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MATTHEW GALLAGHER of 
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 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of Yonkers (City) to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granting the petition filed by the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 456 (Local 456) for unit placement of the 
titles of Director of General Services, Director of Purchasing, and Budget Analyst into 
the unit of City employees represented by Local 456.1   
EXCEPTIONS 
 The City argues that the ALJ should have excluded the Director of General 
Services (DGS) and the Director of Purchasing (DP) because they are managerial 
employees and that the ALJ should have excluded Budget Analysts (BAs) because they 
                                                     
1 49 PERB ¶ 4005 (2016).  
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are confidential employees.  
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ’s decision and are discussed here only as 
far as is necessary to address the exceptions.  The unit represented by Local 456 
consists of 48 white-collar administrative titles totaling approximately 60 employees.  
The evidence that was offered pertaining to each of these disputed titles is separately 
presented below. 
Director of General Services  
 One person, Joseph Celli, holds this title.  Celli testified that he has been in the 
position for 18 years and oversees the facilities maintenance staff of approximately 32 
people, of whom four are in Local 456’s white-collar unit.  The rest are in a blue-collar 
unit also represented by Local 456. 
 Celli testified that he reports to three Deputy Commissioners and the 
Commissioner of Public Works.  Celli attends monthly meetings, which the 
Commissioner holds, and reports on the status of various projects.  The Commissioner 
sets priorities for work and Celli sees that those are executed.2  Celli supervises two 
Assistant Superintendents of Buildings, who in turn supervise the people working on the 
various projects within General Services.   
Celli is not involved in personnel decision-making, but rather is told, for example, 
who to transfer, and he carries out those instructions.3  He has the authority to 
document disciplinary infractions, but does not do so and, instead, leaves that to the 
                                                     
2 Tr, at 15-16.  
3 Tr, at 21-22.   
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people below him to do.  Disciplinary reports are forwarded directly to the Commissioner 
for a final determination as to how to proceed.4  Celli does not have access to the 
personnel records of the employees under his supervision.  He decides how work will 
get done and sees that it is executed.  Celli testified that he submits a draft budget, 
including capital improvements, to the Commissioner.  The Commissioner reviews and 
makes changes to Celli’s draft budget and then submits the budget to the Mayor, who 
makes further changes.5   Celli gave no indication that his budget figures relate to 
specific personnel changes or lines for salaries and/or benefits. 
The record includes a job description for the title of “Director of General 
Services.”  The description states, among other things, that  
this position is responsible for planning, directing and 
implementing a standard operational policy for the general 
services of the City including property management, 
efficiency studies, general management of selected 
operations, budget preparation, etc.  The work includes 
evaluating current operations to provide guidance, 
instruction or resolution of problems.  The incumbent has the 
added responsibility for planning and directing the activities 
and assignments to ensure effective deployment of 
personnel.6 
 
Director of Purchasing (DP) 
 Commissioner of Finance and Management Services, John Liszewski, 
supervises the title of DP.  Liszewski has been employed by the City for 28 years in 
various capacities including Budget Analyst, Senior Budget Analyst, Director of General 
Purchasing, and Director of General Services for the Department of Public Works.  In 
                                                     
4 Tr, at 24.   
5 Tr, at 19-20.  
6 Joint Ex 1, Attachment B. 
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his present capacity he oversees all financial activity of the City and the Yonkers Board 
of Education.   
 Liszewski gave little testimony as to his present duties as Commissioner other 
than to cite his responsibility to oversee the financial activities of the City and the 
Yonkers School District.  He said he has no role in negotiations, although he is kept 
informed of their progress.7  
 The DP reports to Liszewski and the Deputy Commissioner for Finance and 
Management Services.8  Liszewski said the DP is required to know bidding procedures 
under the law, makes bid recommendations to the Board of Supply which consists of 
the Mayor, the City Council President, the City Engineer, and Liszewski, and ensures 
compliance with all state laws and the City charter.9  To make purchasing 
recommendations, the DP receives feedback from department heads.  He also 
supervises 12 employees and can impose discipline.  Asked to describe the DP’s typical 
work activities, Liszewski said he maintains the City’s purchasing policies, receives bids, 
and executes contract awards.  Liszewski did not know, however, the amount of the 
budget that the DP works with and, when prompted, said it is upwards of 100 or 200 
million dollars.   
 Although the job description for the DP states that the DP establishes purchasing 
policies and procedures, Liszewski said that those policies relate to the bidding process, 
and the DP does not have the final say.  He merely makes recommendations as to how 
the bidding process can function most effectively.  When the Yonkers Board of 
                                                     
7 Tr, at 47, 48.   
8 No testimony was given regarding the deputy’s duties. 
9 Tr, at 41-42.   
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Education was merged with the City, the DP changed some of the Board’s bidding 
policies to conform them with those of the City.  Then, again, the DP did not have the 
final say, but reviewed his proposed changes with Liszewski, the Deputy Commissioner, 
or the Law Department.10 
The job description for the title of DP states, among other things, that the DP 
is responsible for directing the purchasing functions by 
approving all purchases in accordance with the limits 
established by State law.  The incumbent analyzes formal 
bids and makes recommendations to the Board of Contract 
and Supply.  The work also involves establishing, 
documenting and maintaining purchasing policy and 
procedures . . . .11 
 
Budget Analyst (BA) 
 Liszewski also testified to the duties of the BA, which position he held along with 
Senior Budget Analyst when he came to the City’s employ 28 years ago.  There are 
presently three people in the BA position: Michael Brown, Robert O’Mara, and John 
Jacobson. 
 Liszewski said that as a BA many years ago he was assigned to handle 
budgetary matters for the budget office and the Police Department, and analyzed the 
costs of expenses such as programs, materials and overtime.12  Asked if he was 
involved in the negotiations process, he said only to the extent of providing budgetary 
information.13  He added that, as for his own role presently in negotiations, he has been 
                                                     
10 Tr, at 51-52.   
11 Joint Ex 1, Attachment B. 
12 Tr, at 32.   
13 Id.    
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copied on some communication relating to costing that Jacobson did.14  He noted that 
the other two BAs have not been involved in costing, but could be.  Liszewski also said 
that he believes Jacobson has not been present during the negotiations themselves.15  
Elaborating, he explained that Jacobson’s role has been limited to, at times, costing out 
salary and fringe benefits for the City contracts.   
 Asked what other functions the BAs who presently work within his division 
perform, he explained that they prepare the budget for the City and the Board of 
Education and monitor compliance with it throughout the year.  They help to prepare a 
spending plan which projects budget costs over a four-year period.  The budget, 
Liszewski said, represents policy and the BAs have the opportunity to influence that 
since they are part of the process that allocates funds to various areas.  Budget figures 
also reflect the number of employees the City can have and where resources are going 
to be assigned, including layoffs.16 
The job description for the title of BA states, among other things, that the BA 
is responsible for assisting in the preparation and monitoring 
of the Budget and for updating and developing improved 
departmental budgeting, management and reporting 
systems . . . [D]irect supervision is received from an 
immediate supervisor . . . .17 
 
DISCUSSION 
Section 201.7(a) of the Act defines a public employee as a “person holding a 
position by appointment or employment in the service of a public employer.”  The 
                                                     
14 Tr, at 47, 48.  
15 Tr, at 48.  
16 Tr, at 37.   
17 Joint Ex 1, Attachment B.  There is no indication in the record of who supervises BAs.  
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statute exempts from this definition those individuals whom the Board may designate 
either “managerial” or “confidential,” employees, if the criteria in § 201.7(a) are met.18  
The Board strictly applies the statutory criteria for such designations, with all 
uncertainties resolved in favor of coverage under the Act. 19   
Employees may be designated as managerial only if they are persons “(i) who 
formulate policy or (ii) who may reasonably be required on behalf of the public employer 
to assist directly in the preparation for and conduct of collective negotiations or to have 
a major role in the administration of agreements or in personnel administration, provided 
that such role is not of a routine or clerical nature and requires the exercise of 
independent judgment.”  Our designation of employees as managerial is based on 
evidence in the record concerning duties actually performed or duties that an employee 
may actually be reasonably required to perform in the future, and we will not deprive an 
employee of representation based on a job description alone.20  
Notably, the Act does not exclude supervisors from coverage, nor does it define 
what constitutes a supervisor.21  Thus, with respect to employees who are alleged to 
                                                     
18 While an employer’s opinion that certain employees are managerial or confidential is 
entitled to serious consideration, our determination must be based on the application of 
the statutory criteria to the parties’ evidence.  Lippman v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 
263 AD2d 891, 896-897, 32 PERB ¶ 7017 (3d Dept 1999), confirming 30 PERB ¶ 3067 
(1997); State of New York, 5 PERB ¶ 3001, 3003 (1972).  
19 Lippman v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 263 AD2d 891, at 896; Town of Walworth, 
43 PERB ¶ 3013, 3052 (2010); Fashion Institute of Technology, 42 PERB ¶ 3018, 3061 
(2009); Owego-Apalachin Cent Sch Dist, 33 PERB ¶ 3005, 3014 (2000).  
20 Hoosick Falls Cent Sch Dist, 46 PERB ¶ 3015, 3031 (2013); Uniformed Firefighters 
Association of Scarsdale, Local 1394, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 39 PERB ¶ 3009, 3041 (2006), 
County of Rockland, 28 PERB ¶ 3063, 3145 (1995); Town of East Fishkill, 27 PERB      
¶ 3166, 3073 (1994). 
21 St. Paul Boulevard Fire Dist, 42 PERB ¶ 3009 (2009).  This distinguishes the Act from 
the National Labor Relations Act, see 29 USC §§ 152(3) and (11).  
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formulate policy, the Act’s language mandates that we distinguish  employees who 
perform various supervisory duties and responsibilities, but who nonetheless have the 
right to representation under the Act, and the much narrower subset of employees with 
broad powers to develop “particular objectives of a government or agency thereof in the 
fulfillment of its mission and the method, means and extent of achieving such 
objectives.”22  Only the latter employees are excluded. 
The applicable standard for determining whether an employee formulates policy, 
pursuant to § 207.1(a)(i) of the Act, was set forth in City of Binghamton: 
To formulate policy is to participate with regularity in the 
essential process involving the determination of the goals 
and objectives of the government involved, and of the 
methods for accomplishing those goals and objectives that 
have a substantial impact upon the affairs and the 
constituency of the government.  The formulation of policy 
does not extend to the determination of methods of 
operation that are merely of a technical nature.23 
 
Employees may be designated as confidential only if they are persons who assist 
and act in a confidential capacity to managerial employees concerning collective 
negotiations, contract administration or personnel administration.24  Our designation of 
employees as confidential, like our examination of other unit placement issues, is based 
on the job duties actually performed, as shown on the record, and we will not deprive an 
                                                     
22 State of New York, 5 PERB ¶ 3001, at 3005; State of New York-Unified Court 
System, 30 PERB ¶ 3067, at 3168. 
23 12 PERB ¶ 3099, 3185 (1979). 
24 Act, §201.7(a) provides specifically that “Employees may be designated as 
confidential only if they are persons who assist and act in a confidential capacity 
managerial employees described in clause ii,” that is, employees “who may reasonably 
be required on behalf of the public employer to assist directly in the preparation for and 
conduct of collective negotiations or to have a major role in the administration of 
agreements or in personnel administration provided that such role is not of a routine or 
clerical nature and requires the exercise of independent judgment.”  
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employee of representation based on a job description alone.25   
In Town of Dewitt,26 the Board held that the Act establishes a two-pronged test 
for a confidential designation: the employee must both assist a managerial employee in 
his or her labor relations managerial functions and act in a confidential capacity to the 
managerial employee.  The former prong reflects the confidential employee’s duties, 
while the latter connotes a confidential employment relationship involving trust and 
confidence between the managerial employee and the confidential employee.27  The 
two parts of the test are distinct, and satisfaction of one might not satisfy the other.28     
Director of General Services (DGS) 
 The City argues that DGS Joseph Celli is a managerial employee based on his 
role in formulating policy.  The City argues that the DGS job description alone warrants 
Celli’s designation and that Celli’s testimony further supports a managerial designation. 
 We affirm the ALJ’s finding that Celli is not a managerial employee. 
 First, our designation of employees as managerial is based on evidence in the 
record concerning duties actually performed or duties that an employee may actually be 
reasonably required to perform in the future, and we will not deprive an employee of 
                                                     
25 See Uniformed Firefighters Association of Scarsdale, Local 1394, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 49 
PERB ¶ 3009, at 3041; County of Rockland, 28 PERB ¶ 3063, at 3145; Town of East 
Fishkill,  27 PERB ¶ 3073, at 3166 (1994); Adirondack Community College, 20 PERB     
¶ 3070, 3149-3150 (1987); City of Binghamton, 12 PERB ¶ 3099, at 3186.  
26 32 PERB ¶ 3001, 3002 (1999). 
27 Id.  See also Hoosick Falls Cent Sch Dist, 46 PERB ¶ 3015, at 3033; State of New 
York (Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation), 39 PERB ¶ 3007, 3030 
(2006); City of Rome, 39 PERB ¶ 3009, 3037 (2006); New York Power Authority, 38 
PERB ¶ 3003, 3008 (2005). 
28 Town of Dewitt, 32 PERB ¶ 3001, at 3002; Hoosick Falls Cent Sch Dist, 46 PERB      
¶ 3015, at 3033; North-Rose Wolcott Cent Sch Dist, 33 PERB ¶ 3002, 3008 (2000).  
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representation based on a job description alone.29  
Further, while the job description states that the DGS is “responsible for planning, 
directing and implementing a standard operational policy for the general services of the 
City,”30  Celli’s testimony failed to establish that he actually formulates policy in the 
sense contemplated by the Act.  Celli testified that he submits a proposed budget, 
reviews the department’s operations, and created a work order system.  These tasks do 
not show that Celli is among the subset of employees with broad powers to develop 
“particular objectives of a government or agency thereof in the fulfillment of its mission 
and the method, means and extent of achieving such objectives.”31  Rather, Celli 
appears to participate only in determining methods of operations that are of a technical 
nature.  Because the record does not show that Celli participates with regularity in the 
essential process involving the determination of the goals and objectives of the City and 
of the methods for accomplishing those goals and objectives, we conclude that Celli is 
not a managerial employee.32   
Director of Purchasing (DP) 
 The City argues that the DP is a managerial employee because the DP 
formulates policy, citing the DP’s job description and Liszewski’s testimony.  
 We affirm the ALJ’s finding that the DP is not a managerial employee.  While 
                                                     
29 Hoosick Falls Cent Sch Dist, 46 PERB ¶ 3015, at 3031; Uniformed Firefighters 
Association of Scarsdale, Local 1394, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 39 PERB ¶ 3009, 3041 (2006), 
County of Rockland, 28 PERB ¶ 3063, 3145 (1995); Town of East Fishkill, 27 PERB      
¶ 3166, 3073 (1994). 
30 Joint Ex 1, Attachment B.  
31 State of New York, 5 PERB ¶ 3001, at 3005; State of New York-Unified Court 
System, 30 PERB ¶ 3067, at 3168.   
32 Lippman v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 263 AD2d 891, at 900. 
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Liszewski testified that the DP is responsible for purchases for the City and the Board of 
Education, evaluates bids and makes recommendations to the Board of Supply, and 
ensures compliance with state laws and the City charter, these tasks do not show that 
the DP participates with regularity in the essential process involving the determination of 
the goals and objectives of the City and of the methods for accomplishing those goals 
and objectives.  Instead, as with Celli, it appears that the CP participates only in 
determining methods of operations that are of a technical nature.  Further, although 
Liszewski testified that the DP changed some of the Board of Education’s bidding 
policies to conform them with the City’s policies, this one-time event does not show 
regular participation in setting the goals or objectives of the City, particularly where 
Liszewski also testified that the DP did not have the final say, but, rather, that the 
proposed changes were approved by Liszewski, the Deputy Commissioner, or the Law 
Department.33  Thus, the record does not establish that the DP exercises “independent 
judgment reflecting substantial discretionary responsibility, including standard setting.”34  
In sum, we conclude that the DP is not a managerial employee. 
Budget Analyst (BA) 
 The City argues that BAs should be designated as confidential employees based 
on their role in costing collective-bargaining proposals.  We affirm the ALJ’s rejection of 
this argument.  As the ALJ found, Liszewski’s testimony and the other evidence 
introduced (primarily the BA job description) is insufficient to warrant a confidential 
designation.   
                                                     
33 Tr, at 51-52.   
34 Hoosick Falls Cent Sch Dist, 46 PERB ¶ 3015, at 3031, citing Lippman v NYS Pub 
Empl Relations Bd, 263 AD2d 891, at 902.  
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 As a threshold matter, the City did not except to the ALJ’s finding that “the BA is 
not a managerial employee.”35  Nor did the City except to the finding that the record 
“failed to support the premise that “Liszewski or his deputy formulate policy or have a 
major role in the administration of agreements,” and thus “Liszewski is not a managerial 
employee for the purposes of deciding the status of the DP and the BAs in this 
proceeding.”36  Because the City did not except to these findings, their factual 
sufficiency and basis is not properly before us.37  In particular, we do not opine as to 
whether or not Liszewski was a managerial employee under § 201.7(a)(i), requiring a 
determination as to whether he played a major role in formulating policy.  However, for 
an employee to be deemed confidential, that “employee must assist and act in a 
confidential capacity to a managerial employee who performs the statutorily enumerated 
labor relations responsibilities for managerial employees, including collective bargaining 
negotiations, contract administration, and personnel administration.”38  Even were we to 
look beyond the City’s fatal failure to except to the ALJ’s conclusion on this issue, her 
finding that Liszewski was not such a managerial employee under § 201.7(a)(ii) is 
supported by his own testimony that he had no involvement in such matters.  Thus, 
regardless of their actual duties, and the trust Liszewski may or may not have reposed 
                                                     
35 49 PERB ¶ 4005, at 4032. 
36 Id at 4031. 
37 NYCTA (Burke), 49 PERB ¶ 3021, 3072 n. 4 (2016); City University of New York, 48 
PERB ¶ 3021, 3071 (2015) (citing Rules § 213.2(b)(4)); Village of Endicott, 47 PERB    
¶ 3017, 3052, n. 5 (2014); City of Schenectady, 46 PERB ¶ 3025, 3056, at n. 8 (2013), 
confd sub nom Matter of City of Schenectady v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 47 PERB 
¶ 7004 (Sup Ct Albany Co 2014), affd 136 AD3d 1086 (3d Dept 2016). 
38 Lippman v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 263 AD2d  at 902, citing State of New York, 
5 PERB ¶ 3001, 3006 (1972), Town of Dewitt, 32 PERB ¶ 3001 (1999); Matter of 
Newburgh Enlarged City School Dist, 21 PERB ¶ 3047 (1988). 
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in them, the BAs cannot be deemed confidential employees through their relationship 
with him.39 
In sum, no evidence has been adduced to establish that BAs act in a confidential 
capacity to a managerial employee.  The record does not establish that BAs report to 
managerial employee or that BAs are in a relationship of “trust and confidence” with any 
managerial employee.40   
 IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Local 456’s unit placement petitions are 
granted.  
DATED:  November 6, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
    
 
 
                                                     
39 Id.  See also County of Otsego, 34 PERB ¶ 3024 (2001). 
40 Town of Dewitt, 32 PERB ¶ 3001, at 3003.  See also City of Rome, 39 PERB ¶ 3009, 
at 3037; Village of Suffern, 38 PERB ¶ 3016, 3057 (2005).   
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 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, City Employees Union, Local 237 (Local 237) to a decision and order of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).1  The ALJ found that the Lawrence Union Free School 
District (District) did not violate § 209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it unilaterally transferred work performed by Information Technology 
Aides, Level I (ITAs) and Security Aides to outside contractors.  ITAs and Security Aides 
were both represented by Local 237.  The ALJ also found that the District did not violate 
§§ 209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act by transferring the work because Local 237 failed to 
establish a prima facie case of retaliatory motive. 
                                                     
1 49 PERB ¶ 4587 (2016). 
Case No. U-34446  -2- 
 
 
EXCEPTIONS 
 Local 237 filed seven exceptions to the ALJ’s decision.  With respect to the 
allegation that the District unlawfully transferred bargaining-unit work, Local 237 argues 
that the ALJ erred by finding that the work performed by employees of the outside 
contractors was not substantially similar to the work performed by ITAs and Security 
Aides.2  Local 237 also contends that the ALJ erred in dismissing its claim that the 
District transferred work to retaliate for employees protected activity, incorrectly finding 
that Local 237 had failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory motive.3  Finally, 
Local 237 asserts that the District failed to present any legitimate business justification 
for the transfer of work.4  
 The District supports the ALJ’s decision and contends that no basis has been 
demonstrated for reversal.   
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties’ 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ as to the ITAs.  We reverse the ALJ’s 
decision in part, and remand in part, with respect to the Security Aides.  
FACTS 
The District and Local 237 are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) 
dated July 1, 2007 through June 30, 2012 which includes the titles of ITA and Security 
Aide.  The District employed ITAs and Security Aides from 1980 until mid-2015, when 
the employment of the persons filling those positions was terminated and the work was 
                                                     
2 Exceptions 6 and 7.  
3 Exceptions 1-3. 
4 Exceptions 4 and 5. 
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assigned by the District to outside contractors.  The termination of employees occurred 
in the context of on-going negotiations for a successor CBA, although no negotiations 
were held regarding the District’s decision to assign the work of ITAs and Security Aides 
to outside contractors, identified as Shoreline Networks Inc. (Shoreline) and Summit 
Security Services (Summit), respectively. 
Information Technology Aides, Level I 
 The ITA level I position is intended to perform duties as spelled out in the Nassau 
County Civil Service job description.5  Those duties include diagnosis of first-level 
personal computer/workstation problems, learning and assisting in network 
maintenance, performing minor hardware adjustments, assisting in the demonstration of 
operating computers and related equipment, and referring more complex problems to 
other personnel.  Testimony established, however, that the District’s ITAs assisted with 
VCR and television set-ups, managed inventory, performed anti-virus scans, 
investigated Wi-Fi connection issues, handled printer maintenance and repair, assisted 
with computer log-in issues, and oversaw the District’s computer lab program.  Duties 
that the ITAs performed outside of the job description included photography, 
PowerPoint presentations, and graduation visual displays.   
Shoreline employee Mike Walsh has been employed as the District’s on-site 
network technician since 2008.  Walsh, supported by Shoreline, handled all network 
administration including engineering, firewalls, exchange servers, storage systems, and 
software systems.  He also performed many of the duties included in the ITA level I job 
                                                     
5 Respondent’s Ex 1. 
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description, such as importing data, manipulating data bases, generating reports, and 
upgrading District network operating systems.  Additionally, Walsh installed and made 
operational the District’s PC workstations and computer labs, and built-up system 
images.  Although it was not among his primary duties, Walsh also assisted when ITAs 
could not open Microsoft or get the computers to turn on.   
Security Aides 
 The Civil Service job description for Security Aides advises that the duties 
include patrolling and protecting school buildings and grounds and performing “related 
duties” as required.6  It also outlines unskilled tasks such as sweeping and attending to 
parking areas.  District witness testimony established that Security Aides did not carry 
firearms7 or wear formal uniforms,8 and they would monitor or report emergency 
situations or disorder, but would not ordinarily directly intervene.  Former Security Aide 
Danette Jamal, however, provided some specific instances where intervention did 
occur.9  The District also noted that the Security Aides could direct traffic in District lots, 
but not on public roads even when roadways are adjacent to District property.  They 
were not responsible for crowd control or security on school buses.  They were not part 
of the District’s school safety plan, nor did they work under the direct supervision of law 
enforcement officers or those previously in the field of law enforcement.  Qualifications 
                                                     
6 Respondent’s Ex 2. 
7 Though one witness said many in her rank were licensed to do so.  Tr, at p 98. 
8 They were required by the District only to wear blue logo t-shirts and jeans or dark 
slacks, although this was not always the case.  Tr, at pp 46-47, 94, 211-212.  By 
comparison, the new security personnel wear uniforms provided by Summit, including 
jackets and hats identifying them as security staff. Tr, at pp 211-212. 
9 Tr, at p 117. 
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for the Security Aide title include an 8th grade education and one year of experience in 
security.  They are required to complete 24 hours of training for licensure by the New 
York State Education Department (SED) and, thereafter, complete eight hours of 
additional training on an annual basis to maintain their license. 
 The District began to reevaluate its security function and safety protocols after 
the attacks at Columbine and Sandy Hook.  Superintendent Gary Schall explained that 
he regularly received parental inquiries about the security of District premises, and 
those same concerns were conveyed by him to the Board of Education and from 
members of the public at board meetings.   
 On August 3, 2015, the District entered into a contract with Summit pursuant to 
the District’s new security plan.10  Summit is run by four former law enforcement 
officers.  The company provides a site supervisor who is a former military policeman 
and former employee of the Nassau County Police Department.  Its officers wear 
uniforms and are registered New York State security guards.  While Summit officers are 
unarmed, the firm will provide armed personnel within 24 hours, if requested.11  All 
Summit officers have background checks, and the company assumes liability for acts of 
negligence.  Summit guards provide security at all school events, including those after 
hours.  They intervene in emergency and crowd control situations.  They direct traffic 
both on and off District property including public streets, which the District maintains is 
essential for lockdown situations.  The services provided by Summit have been 
                                                     
10 Summit is licensed by New York State and is a state approved vendor. 
11 This was testified to by Schall; however, there is no provision in the contract between 
Summit and the District expressly providing for this.  Joint Ex 5. 
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incorporated into the District’s school safety plan. 
 The duties of Summit personnel include patrolling and protecting school buildings 
and grounds, ensuring the safety of persons on school premises, maintaining security 
and order, assisting in fire drills and inspections, assisting in crowd control, directing 
and regulating the flow of traffic, assisting in developing security plans, maintaining log 
books, and reporting unusual occurrences to law enforcement.  Qualifications for 
Summit officers include high school graduation and six months of experience in security 
operations.12 
 One former Security Aide, James Bowles, stated that he was offered a position 
with Summit after he was terminated by the District; however, he was unclear as to who 
made that offer and said he was told by someone only that the job “might” have been 
available.13  
 Regarding the claim that the District acted without bargaining with the unit, Local 
237’s Long Island Area Director John Burns testified that at no point during the 
protracted negotiations for a successor CBA did the District formally propose the 
terminations, the subcontracting, or any other “cost-saving measures.”14  There was, 
however, mention that cost savings were something to “think about,”15 although Burns 
said the union did not take it seriously.16   
 
                                                     
12 Respondent’s Ex 3. 
13 Tr, at p 130. 
14 Local 237’s Brief, at p 3. 
15 This statement applied to both Security Aides and ITAs.  
16 Tr, at p 27. 
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DISCUSSION  
Section 209-a.1(d) allegations 
It is well established that two essential questions must be addressed when 
determining whether a transfer of unit work violates § 209-a.1(d) of the Act: (1) was the 
at-issue work exclusively performed by unit employees for a sufficient period of time to 
establish a binding past practice; and (2) was the work assigned to non-unit personnel 
substantially similar to that exclusive unit work.17  If both these questions are answered 
in the affirmative, a violation of § 209-a.1(d) of the Act will be found unless there has 
been a significant change in job qualifications.  When there has been a significant 
change in job qualifications, the respective interests of the employer and the unit 
employees must be balanced to determine whether the Act has been violated.18 
With respect to the allegation that the District unlawfully transferred work 
performed by ITAs to Shoreline employees, the ALJ found that the work performed by 
ITAs was not exclusive to unit employees because Walsh had been performing a 
significant portion of ITA work from as early as 2008.  A finding that work was not 
exclusive to the unit is alone sufficient to defeat an allegation that a transfer of work 
                                                     
17  Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶ 3005 (2008), confirmed and mod, in 
part, Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 61 AD3d 1231, 42 
PERB ¶ 7004 (3d Dept 2009), on remand, 42 PERB ¶ 3016 (2009).  See also County of 
Chemung and Chemung Co Sheriff, 50 PERB ¶ 3022 (2017); Cayuga Community 
College, 50 PERB ¶ 3003, 3012-3013 (2017); Greater Amsterdam City Sch Dist, 49 
PERB ¶ 3011, 3046 (2016); Town of Riverhead, 42 PERB ¶3032, 3119 (2009); Town of 
Stony Point, 45 PERB ¶ 3045, 3115 (2012); Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority, 
18 PERB ¶ 3083, 3182 (1985).  
18 Cayuga Community College, 50 PERB ¶ 3003, at 3012-3013, quoting State of NY 
(Div State Police), 48 PERB ¶ 3012, 3041 (2015); Town of Stony Point, 45 PERB           
¶ 3045, at 3115, citing Town of Riverhead, 42 PERB ¶ 3032 (2009). 
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violates § 209-a.1(d) of the Act.19   
Local 237 did not file any exceptions to the ALJ’s finding, and it has therefore 
waived any argument that the ALJ erred in her finding on exclusivity.20  As a result, we 
affirm the ALJ’s dismissal of this allegation21 and find it unnecessary to address Local 
237’s other contentions.  
With respect to the allegation that the District unlawfully transferred work 
performed by Security Aides to Summit employees, the parties stipulated that 
“exclusivity with respect to the Security Aides is not contested.”22  The ALJ nevertheless 
found that the transfer did not violate § 209-a.1(d) of the Act because she found that the 
work assigned to Summit employees was not substantially similar to the work performed 
by Security Aides.  In support, the ALJ found that Summit employees direct and 
regulate traffic in public streets, provide security on school buses and for special events, 
wear professional uniforms that clearly identify them as security patrols, and that they 
are directly supervised by persons with law enforcement training and experience.  
Relying on Schall’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that the District specifically 
                                                     
19 See, eg, City of Canandaigua, 47 PERB ¶ 3025, 3072 (2014); Canastota Cent Sch 
Dist, 32 PERB ¶ 3003, 3006 (1999); County of Suffolk and Suffolk Co Sheriff, 29 PERB 
3002, 3007 (1996).  
20 See Rules of Procedure § 213.2; NYCTA (Burke), 49 PERB ¶ 3021, 3072, n. 4 (2016) 
and cases cited therein; Village of Endicott, 47 PERB ¶3017, 3052, n. 5 (2014).  
21 The ALJ’s finding is based on her crediting Walsh’s testimony that he performed a 
significant portion of the work of the ITAs.  The ALJ’s credibility resolutions are fully 
consistent with the record, and we therefore see no basis to reverse the ALJ's decision, 
even had exceptions been filed.  See, eg, Bellmore-Merrick Cent Sch Dist, 48 PERB     
¶ 3022, 3077 (2015); Mount Pleasant Cottage Union Free Sch Dist, 50 PERB ¶ 3002, 
3008 (2017); Catskill Housing Auth, 49 PERB ¶ 3025, at 3081; County of Clinton, 47 
PERB ¶ 3026, 3079 (2014); Buffalo Sewer Auth, 31 PERB 3083, 3182 (1998).  
22 Tr, at 6.  
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implemented a heightened and more professional security presence through its contract 
with Summit.   
As explained below, we find that the scope of the stipulation is ambiguous in 
such a way that we cannot fully assess the correctness of the ALJ’s conclusions, and 
we shall remand in part for further proceedings.  For the reasons given below, we also 
reverse the ALJ’s finding in part and find that the transfer of unit work exclusively 
performed by Security Aides did violate § 209-a.1(d) of the Act.  
The “General Statement of Duties” in the Civil Service job description for Security 
Aides states that a Security Aide “[p]atrols and protects school buildings and grounds.”23   
That is, Security Aides’ general duties are to protect the District’s property.  The 
stipulation between the parties means, at a minimum, that “property protection” duties 
were exclusively performed by Security Aides.  
There was testimony, however, that Security Aides also intervened in situations 
to protect the safety of persons using the District’s premises (i.e., “personal 
protection”).24  It is not clear whether the stipulation covered these additional duties, 
particularly since the District argued that the ability to intervene was one of the key 
differences between Security Aides and Summit employees.25   
With respect to “property protection,” the Civil Service job description for Security 
Guards, which the District admits conforms to some of the duties of Summit employees, 
states that a Security Guard, like a Security Aide, “[p]atrols and protects school 
                                                     
23 Respondent’s Ex 2.  The general statement also says that a Security Aide “performs 
related duties as required.”  See also Tr, at 86.  
24 See Tr, at 113, 120, 127, 325.  
25 See Respondent Post-Hearing Brief, at 1, 8, 15.  
Case No. U-34446  -10- 
 
 
buildings and grounds.”26  That is, Summit employees perform the same “property 
protection” duties that Security Aides performed.   
Because the “property protection” work assigned to Summit employees was 
previously performed exclusively by Security Aides, we find that a violation of § 209-
a.1(d) of the Act has been established under Niagara Frontier and its progeny with 
respect to the “property protection” work, unless there has been a significant change in 
job qualifications.   
The ALJ found that there had been no showing that the qualifications of Summit 
employees have been changed significantly from that of Security Aides.  No exceptions 
were filed to this finding, and we agree, in any event, with the ALJ’s conclusion.  The 
minimum qualifications for Security Guards are somewhat different than those for 
Security Aides,27 but such minor differences do not amount to a significant change in 
job qualifications.28  Moreover, as the ALJ found, there was no showing that Summit 
hires to the standards of the job description for Security Guards.29   
The District argued that it implemented a higher level of services and should be 
excused from bargaining on that basis.  However, “[a]lthough improved service is often 
                                                     
26 Respondent’s Ex 3.   
27 Security Guards must graduate from high school and have six months of satisfactory 
law enforcement and/or security operations experience, while Security Aides need to 
possess an eight grade education and one year of satisfactory work experience.  
Respondent’s Exs 2 & 3.   
28 County of Westchester, 42 PERB ¶ 3025, 3099 (2009).   
29 In its brief to the ALJ, the District relied on Town of Brookhaven, 17 PERB ¶ 3087 
(1984), and West Hempstead, 17 PERB ¶ 3087 (1984) to argue that it had no obligation 
to bargain over the transfer at issue here.  R Post-Hearing Brief, at 18-20. Town of 
Brookhaven and West Hempstead, however, both involved situations where the 
qualifications of employees assigned to perform the work had changed.  See 17 PERB 
¶ 3087, at 3133-3134; Niagara Frontier, 18 PERB ¶ 3083, at 3182.   
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a reason given by employers in justification of their unilateral subcontracting, it has not 
been considered a defense to a refusal to bargain allegation.”30  Although the ALJ found 
that Summit employees performed additional duties that Security Aides did not perform, 
such as directing traffic in public streets and providing security on school buses and for 
special events, these additional duties are “immaterial to our determination whether the 
nature of the . . . work performed on behalf of the County is substantially similar.”31  
Moreover, “the fiscal or operational wisdom of a decision to subcontract unit work is 
immaterial to the negotiability of the subject.”32   
As mentioned above, the exclusivity of “personal protection” work is not clear.  If 
the parties stipulated that “personal protection” work was exclusively performed by 
Security Aides, it would appear that such was work was subsequently performed by 
Summit employees.  Such circumstances, as explained above, would establish a 
violation of the Act here, where no change in qualifications has been shown.  By 
contrast, if the stipulation does not cover “personal protection” work, that element of the 
violation would not have been established by the Charging Party, and no violation of the 
                                                     
30 Town of Smithtown, 25 PERB ¶ 3081, 3166 (1992).  See also County of Erie, 29 
PERB ¶ 3045, 3106 (1996) (finding, in case involving subcontracting of medical 
services, that “[i]n assessing the negotiability of the County’s decision, the issue is not 
whether the care provided to the Home’s residents is in fact better than before the 
subcontract . . . or whether it is unchanged or worse than before . . . .).   
31 County of Westchester, 42 PERB ¶ 3025, at 3099.  See also County of Erie and Erie 
Community College, 39 PERB ¶ 3005, 3020 (2006).  
32 Manhasset Union Free Sch Dist, 41 PERB ¶ 3005, at 3021; Cayuga Community 
College, 50 PERB ¶ 3003, at 3013.  See also New York State Thruway Auth, 33 PERB 
¶ 3017, 3042 (2000), confd New York State Thruway Auth v NYS Pub Empl Relations 
Bd, 279 AD2d 851, 34 PERB ¶ 7003 (3d Dept 2001).  
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Act would have occurred with respect to “personal protection” work.33  Under these 
circumstances, we remand this aspect of the charge to the ALJ for a clarification of the 
scope of the stipulation.  If there is a dispute over the scope of the stipulation, the ALJ 
may, at her discretion, reopen the record for the parties to present offers or proof and/or 
additional evidence as well as arguments about the scope of the stipulation and related 
issues concerning the exclusivity of “personal protection” security work.  
Section 209-a.1(a) and (c) allegation 
 When an improper practice charge alleges unlawfully motivated retaliation in 
violation of §§ 209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act, the charging party has the burden of 
demonstrating three elements by a preponderance of the credible evidence: a) that the 
affected individual engaged in protected activity under the Act; b) such activity was 
known to the person or persons taking the employment action; and c) the employment 
action would not have been taken “but for” the protected activity.34  These elements 
establish a prima facie case and give rise to an inference of improper motivation.35  
Only “if the charging party can establish such an inference, does the burden of 
production shift to the respondent to present evidence demonstrating that its conduct 
                                                     
33 Exclusivity and substantial similarity of the work are elements to be established by the 
charging party in a charge grounded upon a unilateral transfer of unit work.  Cayuga 
Community College, 50 PERB ¶ 3003, at 2012-3013; see NYCTA, 33 PERB ¶ 3017, at 
3041; City of Rome, 32 PERB ¶ 3058, 3140 (1999); Town of Brookhaven, 26 PERB      
¶ 3066, 3121 (1993).  
34 Bellmore-Merrick Cent High Sch Dist, 48 PERB ¶ 3022, 3976 (2015); citing Village of 
Endicott, 47 PERB ¶ 3017, 3050 (2014); see generally UFT (Jenkins), 41 PERB ¶ 3007 
(2008), confd sub nom Jenkins v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 41 PERB ¶ 7007 (Sup 
Ct NY Co 2008), affd, 67 AD3d 567, 42 PERB ¶ 7008 (1st Dept 2009); State of New 
York (State University of New York at Buffalo), 46 PERB ¶ 3021 (2013); see also City of 
Salamanca, 18 PERB ¶ 3012 (1985).  
35 See Town of Tuscarora, 48 PERB ¶ 3011, at 3037.  
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was not improperly motivated.”36 
 The ALJ found that the elements of protected activity and the District’s 
knowledge of protected activity were established, given that the parties were engaged in 
protracted negotiations for a new CBA at the time the District decided to transfer the 
work of ITAs and Security Aides.  There are no exceptions to these findings.37  The ALJ 
found, however, that Local 237 had not demonstrated that the transfer of work would 
not have taken place “but for” Local 237’s participation in contract negotiations.  We 
agree.  
 To establish the “but for” element of unlawful motivation, Local 237 relies on an 
alleged “threat” to outsource bargaining unit work that was made by the Board of 
Education president at a negotiating session, the fact that the District allegedly offered a 
position with Summit to a Security Aide who was not active in Local 237 but failed to 
offer a position to a Security Aide with identical qualifications who was a member of 
Local 237’s negotiating committee, and the timing of the transfer during protracted 
negotiations for a new CBA.38   
 We agree with the ALJ that this circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to show 
that the transfer of work would not have taken place “but for” the contract negotiations, 
                                                     
36 Id; see generally Littlejohn v City of New York, 795 F3d 297, 307-308 (2d Cir 2015). 
37 49 PERB ¶4587, at 4784-4785.  
38 In its brief in support of exceptions, Local 237 argues that the District’s animus 
towards protected activity is also shown by the fact that the subcontracted employees 
were among the last remaining full-time employees represented by Local 237.  This 
alleged fact was not established on the record before the ALJ and, as a result, we do 
not consider it.  Our review is limited to the record as it was developed before the ALJ.  
See, eg, CSEA (Josey), 49 PERB ¶ 3022, 3072 (2016) (quoting Smithtown Fire District, 
28 PERB ¶ 3060, 3135 (1995).     
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for the reasons she gave.  Specifically, we agree that the testimony does not 
demonstrate that a “threat” to outsource ITAs and/or Security Aides was made during 
negotiations.  The only testimony about this alleged threat was Burns’ testimony that the 
Board of Education president “mentioned” outsourcing and said that “we needed to think 
about possibly outsourcing the IT group.  He wanted us to think about outsourcing 
security . . . .”39  The Board president’s statement was vague and mentioned 
outsourcing as simply a possibility and did not state or imply that outsourcing was an 
inevitable consequence of continued contract negotiations.  We agree with the ALJ that 
this statement was neither threatening nor a retaliatory response to Local 237’s 
engagement in protected activity.   
 We also agree with the ALJ that the evidence does not establish that the District 
offered a non-union security job to Security Aide James Bowles.  Bowles offered vague 
testimony that the Assistant Superintendent of Finance and Operations said to him that 
“I might have a job for you.”40  Such testimony simply does not establish that a job offer 
was made to Bowles.  In the absence of the threat and the job offer to Bowles, Local 
237 can point only to the circumstance that the transfer of work took place during 
contract negotiations.  Timing alone, however, is insufficient to satisfy the “but for” 
element of a § 201-a.1(a) or (c) violation.41   
 In sum, we find that the evidence fails to establish that the District would not have 
                                                     
39 Tr, at pp 20, 26-27.  
40 Tr, at pp 129-130.  
41 Bellmore-Merrick Cent High Sch Dist, 48 PERB ¶ 3022, 3076; Board of Educ of the 
City Sch Dist of the City of New York, 35 PERB ¶ 3002, 3004 (2002); Roswell Park 
Cancer Institute, 34 PERB ¶ 3040, 3096 (2001).  
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transferred the work of ITAs and Security Aides “but for” Local 237’s involvement in 
contract negotiations.  As a result, no inference of improper motivation has been 
established, and we shall dismiss this allegation in the charge.  In these circumstances, 
we find it unnecessary to examine whether the ALJ correctly found that the District 
established a legitimate business justification for the transfer of work or Local 237’s 
associated exceptions.   
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ’s decision with respect to ITAs, 
reverse the ALJ’s decision with respect to the “property protection” work performed by 
Security Aides, and remand the allegation concerning “personal protection” work for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  We affirm the decision of the ALJ with 
respect to the allegation that the District violated §§ 209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District forthwith: 
1.  Cease and desist from unilaterally transferring to nonunit personnel the work 
of “property protection” security work previously exclusively performed by Security Aides 
within the bargaining unit represented by Local 237; 
2.  Restore to Security Aides in the unit represented by Local 237 the work of 
“property protection” security; 
3.  Offer reinstatement to all unit employees terminated as a result of the 
District's transfer of “property protection” security work, under the prevailing terms and 
conditions of employment as they existed when the work was transferred; 
4.  Make the affected unit employees whole for wages and benefits, if any, lost as 
a result of its unilateral transfer to nonunit employees of said work, with interest at the 
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maximum legal rate;  
5.  Sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic locations 
customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
DATED:  November 6, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
 
 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
 
we hereby notify all employees of the Lawrence Union Free School District in the 
bargaining unit represented by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, City 
Employees Union, Local 237, that the Village will: 
 
1. Cease and desist from unilaterally transferring to nonunit personnel the work 
of “property protection” security work exclusively performed by Security Aides 
within the bargaining unit represented by Local 237; 
 
2. Restore to Security Aides in the unit represented by Local 237 the work of 
“property protection” security; 
 
3. Offer reinstatement to all unit employees terminated as a result of the 
District's transfer of “property protection” security work, under the prevailing 
terms and conditions of employment as they existed when the work was 
transferred; 
 
4. Make affected unit employees whole for wages and benefits, if any, lost as a 
result of its unilateral transfer to nonunit employees of said work, with interest 
at the maximum legal rate;  
 
Dated . . . . . . . . . .    By  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
        (Representative)   (Title) 
       Lawrence Union Free School District 
 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material 
 
   STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
_________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
LONG BEACH PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, IAFF, LOCAL 287, 
 
Charging Party, 
   - and – 
CASE NO. U-34671 
 
CITY OF LONG BEACH,  
Respondent. 
_________________________________________ 
 
LOUIS D. STOBER, ESQ., for Charging Party 
 
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, PLLC (TERRY O’NEIL & EMILY HARPER of 
counsel), for Respondent 
  
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the City of Long Beach (City) to a 
decision and order of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the City violated   
§ 209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act).1  The ALJ found that 
the City violated the Act by refusing to negotiate over the applicable procedures after 
informing a firefighter represented by the Long Beach Professional Firefighters 
Association, IAFF, Local 287 (Association) that it intended to seek his termination under 
Civil Service Law (CSL) § 71 and providing an opportunity for the employee to be heard 
prior to his termination.  
EXCEPTIONS  
 The City excepts to the ALJ’s finding and argues that it has no obligation to 
bargain prior to terminating an employee pursuant to CSL § 71.  The City also argues 
                                                     
1 50 PERB ¶ 4503 (2017). 
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that the ALJ erred by finding that the charge was facially sufficient to state a claim under 
the Act.  
 The Association supports the ALJ’s decision and contends that no basis has 
been demonstrated for reversal.   
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties’ 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The parties stipulated to the following facts.  The Association and the City are 
parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) covering the period of July 1, 2004 
through June 30, 2010, the terms of which remain in effect pursuant to § 209-a(1) (e) of 
the Act.2  The Association is the recognized bargaining representative “of all City 
employees in the following unit: paid professional members of the fire fighting force in 
the ranks of Fire Fighter, Lieutenant (including all specializations) and any full-time 
professional personnel assigned to the Fire Department as the City may deem 
necessary, and excluding all Volunteer members of the Fire Department.”3 
On or about November 12, 2014, Association member Jay Gusler (Gusler) 
reported that he was injured in the line of duty.  He received Workers’ Compensation 
benefits, and was continuously absent from work using sick leave accruals since on or 
about November 13, 2014.4 
As a result of Gusler’s cumulative absence from work, by letter dated November 
10, 2015, the City informed Gusler that, inter alia: the City “is evaluating whether to 
                                                     
2 Stipulation of Facts, ¶ 1.  
3 Id, ¶ 4.  
4 Id, ¶ 3-8.  
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exercise its right to separate you from employment pursuant to New York Civil Service 
Law [CSL] § 71.”5  The letter further advised Gusler that his employment “may” be 
terminated.  The letter stated that Gusler could meet with Fire Commissioner Scott 
Kemins (Kemins) and representatives of the City on November 24, 2015 if he disputed 
the potential termination, and that Kemins intended to recommend that his employment 
be terminated if he did not contest such termination.6  The letter ended by explaining 
that Gusler may have an opportunity to be reemployed in the future by the City.7 
The Association thereafter sent the City a demand to negotiate the procedure for 
separating a member of the Association from service under CSL § 71 and it provided 
the City with a proposed procedure.  The City has refused to negotiate such procedure.8 
The City did not separate Gusler from service pursuant to § 71 of the CSL.9 
DISCUSSION 
 It is undisputed that public employers are permitted to terminate an employee 
who is absent from work for a cumulative period of one year due to occupational injury 
or disease pursuant to CSL § 71.10  In Town of Cortlandt, the Board examined whether 
an employer is required to bargain prior to exercising this right and found that the 
                                                     
5 Id, Ex 4.   
6 Id, ¶ 9.   
7 Id, Ex 4.  
8 Id, ¶ 10.  
9 Id, ¶ 11.  
10 CSL § 71 provides, inter alia, that, “[w]here an employee has been separated from 
the service by reason of a disability resulting from occupational injury or disease as 
defined in the workmen's compensation law, he shall be entitled to a leave of absence 
for at least one year . . . .”  CSL § 71 has been interpreted to allow, but not require, an 
employer to terminate an employee who is absent from work for a cumulative period of 
one year due to an occupational injury or disease.  See Allen v Howe, 84 NY2d 665 
(1994).   
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employer violated § 209-a.1(d) of the Act by unilaterally adopting a policy requiring 
termination of employment and contractual benefits after one year of occupational 
disability.11  The Board held that nothing in CSL § 71 explicitly addresses collective 
negotiations under the Act, “nor is there anything inescapably implicit in that statute 
which establishes the Legislature’s plain and clear intent to exempt the [employer] from 
the State’s strong public policy favoring the negotiation of all terms and conditions of 
employment.”12  The Board explained that:  
[b]y requiring the negotiation of decisions to terminate 
employees from employment based upon the length of time 
they are away from work due to occupational injuries or 
illnesses, and in the absence of a plain and clear legislative 
intent to the contrary, we give effect to the State's declared 
public policy favoring collective negotiations.13  
 
The Board’s determination was confirmed by the New York Supreme Court, 
Westchester County.14  The Court agreed with the Board that: 
While an employer is permitted to terminate an employee 
who has been disabled by an occupational injury for more 
than one year, there is no requirement that it do so and no 
express prohibition against negotiation of an employer's 
exercise of the prerogative.  Nor does such discretionary 
authority constitute a non-delegable power which, for 
reasons of sound public policy, is implicitly exempt from this 
State's strong policy in support of collective bargaining.  
 
Neither has petitioner overcome this presumption in favor of 
collective bargaining with respect to its unilateral 
implementation of the administrative procedures.  The 
submission of said procedures to the bargaining process 
would not have any adverse effect upon petitioner's ability to 
exercise any of the rights which it is accorded under GML 
                                                     
11 30 PERB ¶ 3031, 3078 (1997).  
12 Id.  
13 Id.   
14 Town of Cortlandt v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 30 PERB ¶ 7012 (1997).  
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207-c.15 
 
 The City argues that the instant case is distinguishable from Town of Cortlandt.  
First, the City argues that it did not establish any procedures, but instead provided a 
hearing to comply with constitutional due process requirements.  We, like the ALJ, find 
this argument unpersuasive.  First, we agree with the ALJ that providing notice to the 
affected employee, an opportunity to be heard, and an automatic recommendation of 
termination if the employee does not pursue the opportunity to be heard, constitute 
procedures for implementing a decision to terminate an employee pursuant to CSL       
§ 71.  Second, even assuming that the City’s hearing was intended to provide 
constitutional due process safeguards, this did not relieve the City of its statutory duty to 
negotiate.16  The City’s statutory duties are “independent of and exceed its 
constitutional obligations.”17  While Prue v Hunt,18 cited by the City, may speak to 
constitutional due process minimums, “the City is still obligated to satisfy its separate 
statutory duty to negotiate the procedures pursuant to which decisions are made as to 
whether the wages and economic benefits . . . will be paid.”19  Put another way, while 
the City may have a constitutional obligation to provide due process, such an obligation 
does not relieve the City of its separate obligation to negotiate concerning the process 
that is implemented. 
 The City also argues that the current case is distinguishable from Town of 
                                                     
15 30 PERB ¶ 7012, at 7025.   
16 City of Syracuse, 32 PERB ¶ 3029, 3062-3063 (1999), affd City of Syracuse v NYS 
Pub Empl Relations Bd, 279 AD2d 98, 33 PERB ¶ 7022 (4th Dept 2000), lv denied 34 
PERB ¶ 7025 (2001).  
17 Id, at 3063.  
18 78 NY2d 364 (1991).  
19 City of Syracuse, 32 PERB ¶ 3029, at 3063.   
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Cortlandt because the City’s letter to Gusler, unlike that in Town of Cortlandt, did not 
require termination but simply stated that the Fire Commissioner may recommend 
termination to the City Manager (although if Gusler did not appear at the hearing, the 
letter stated that the Fire Commissioner would recommend termination).20  We find this 
distinction to be immaterial.  Although the City’s letter to Gusler did not state that 
termination would automatically result from the hearing, it is clear that the hearing, and 
associated right to be heard or to forfeit that right, are steps in the City’s process of 
terminating an employee pursuant to CSL § 71.  As explained above, the City is 
obligated to bargain prior to imposing such steps.   
 Assuming that the Board finds that the current case is not distinguishable from 
Town of Cortlandt, the City argues that the Board should not follow Town of Cortlandt.  
The City argues that its exercise of the discretion to terminate employees granted by 
CSL § 71 is not mandatorily negotiable and that CSL § 71 exempts employers from 
bargaining over a decision to terminate an employee who has been absent for more 
than one year due to occupational injury or disease.  The City argues that CSL § 71 
contains extensive post-termination requirements and that if the legislature had 
intended for there to be pre-termination requirements, it would have provided them.   
 We adhere to the Board’s reasoning in Town of Cortlandt.  As the Board there 
explained, there is nothing inescapably implicit in CSL § 71 which establishes the 
Legislature’s plain and clear intent to exempt employers from the State’s “strong and 
                                                     
20 Stipulation of Facts, Ex. 4.  
sweeping policy” to support employer-employee negotiations.21  The absence of pre-
termination procedures in the statute cannot be read as preempting an employer’s duty 
to negotiate.  As the Court of Appeals explained with regard to GML § 207-c, “the rights 
explicitly given to [employers] are outside the scope of mandatory bargaining,” but the 
statute “does not remove from mandatory bargaining those other matters—such as 
review procedures—that the Legislature chose not to address.”22 
 In its Memorandum of Law submitted to the ALJ, the City asserted that the 
Association proposed to have an arbitrator from the American Arbitration Association 
serve as a hearing officer to determine whether an employee may be separated from 
service under CSL § 71.  The City argued that it should not be required to negotiate who 
will determine whether to separate an employee pursuant to CSL § 71.  The ALJ found 
that the argument was not relevant to the issue before her.  On exceptions, the City 
again argues that it should not have to negotiate who the decision maker would be in a 
hearing under CSL § 71.   
 We, like the ALJ, find that the City’s argument is not relevant to the issue before 
the Board.  An allegation that the Association has made a prohibited proposal in 
negotiations sounds in a violation of the Association’s duty to bargain in good faith.  
There is no improper practice charge in front of us, however, concerning the 
Association’s conduct.  Rather, the only issue we decide today is that the City has an 
obligation to bargain prior to imposing procedures for terminating an employee pursuant 
                                                     
21 Cohoes City School Dist v Cohoes Teachers Assn, 40 NY2d 774, 778, 9 PERB         
¶ 7529 (1976); City of Watertown v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 95 NY2d 73, 78, 33 
PERB ¶ 7007 (2000).  Compare City of Schenectady v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, __ 
NY3d __ , slip op 07210 (Oct 17, 2017) (finding police discipline to be prohibited subject 
of bargaining where policy favoring local control over police set forth in Second Class 
Cities Law prevailed over policy supporting collective bargaining embodied in the Act).   
22 City of Watertown v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 95 NY2d, at 83, citing City of 
Schenectady PBA v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 85 NY2d 480 (1995).   
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to CSL § 71.   
 Finally, the City argues that the charge is facially deficient and should not have 
been processed because it failed to allege that the Association was an employee 
organization covered by § 209-a of the Act, that the Association was the duly-
recognized or certified exclusive bargaining representative of firefighters, or that the City 
was an employer covered by § 209-a of the Act.  We find that the charge is facially 
sufficient to meet our pleading requirements.  Section 204.1(b) of our Rules of 
Procedure concerns the requirements for the contents of a charge.  Nothing therein 
requires that a charge make the specific factual allegations recited by the City.  
Moreover, the City stipulated to the fact that the Association is the recognized exclusive 
bargaining representative “of all City employees in the following unit: paid professional 
members of the fire fighting force in the ranks of Fire Fighter, Lieutenant . . . .”23  The 
City also does not dispute that the Association is an employee organization as defined 
in § 201.5 of the Act or that the City is an employer as defined in § 201.6 of the Act.  
Thus, even assuming that there was some technical deficiency in the charge, the City 
has failed to show that it suffered any prejudice as a result.  
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City forthwith: 
1. rescind its procedure relating to CSL § 71 terminations; and
                                                     
23 Stipulation of Facts at ¶ 2.  
  
2. sign and post the attached notice at all physical and electronic    
locations customarily used to post notices to unit employees. 
DATED:  November 6, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
     
 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
 
We hereby notify all employees of the City of Long Beach in the bargaining unit 
represented by the Long Beach Professional Firefighters Association, IAFF, Local 
287 that the City of Long Beach will: 
 
 
1.  rescind its procedure relating to CSL § 71 terminations. 
 
                       
   
 
 
 
 
Dated . . . . . . . . . .    By  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
         
                   On behalf of the City of Long Beach      
 
 
 
 
 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, 
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.   
 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
__________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
THE VILLAGE OF WESTHAMPTON DUNES  
 
                                                 CASE NO. E-2603  
          
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
 
__________________________________________ 
 
 
BEE READY FISHBEIN HATTER & DONOVAN, LLP (WILLIAM C. DE WITT of 
counsel), for Employer 
 
 REYNOLD A. MAURO, ESQ., for Intervenor 
 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Westhampton Dunes Police 
Constabulary Association (Association) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) granting the application by the Village of Westhampton Dunes (Village) to exclude 
two constable-sergeants as managerial or confidential within the meaning of § 201.7(a) of 
the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act).1  After a hearing, the ALJ found that 
the constable-sergeants should be excluded from the unit as confidential employees.   
EXCEPTIONS 
The Association excepts to the ALJ’s designation of constable-sergeants as 
confidential.  The Association argues that no specific testimony was presented that the 
constable-sergeants have in the past received confidential information that would require 
their designation and that the constable-sergeants’ future potential involvement in 
bargaining is too speculative to warrant their designation as confidential employees.   
                                            
1 50 PERB ¶ 4002 (2017).   
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The Village supports the ALJ’s decision and contends that no basis has been 
demonstrated for reversal.   
Based upon our review of the record and the parties' arguments, we reverse the 
ALJ’s decision. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ’s decision and are discussed here only as 
far as is necessary to address the exceptions.  The Village employs five full-time and five 
part-time constables.  The Association was certified in June 2015 and represents only the 
full-time constables of the Village.  As of the time of the hearing, negotiations for a 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) had commenced between the Association and the 
Village, but the parties had not reached agreement. 
Constables are “peace officers” charged with enforcing the laws of the State and 
Village.  Typical duties include patrols and answering calls for assistance within the 
Village for incidents such as accidents and emergencies, in addition to the general 
maintenance of public order.  Constables also may direct pedestrian and vehicular traffic, 
investigate potential or actual violations of the law, issue summonses and appearance 
tickets, and file activity reports.   
Of the five full-time constables, Brian Hennig and Timothy Turner are the only two 
who are designated “constable-sergeants.”  “Constable-sergeant” is a title used by the 
Village and is not a Civil Service title.  In addition to the duties explained above, Hennig 
and Turner are responsible for scheduling and staffing on a day-to-day basis, including 
the authorization of overtime.  Hennig and Turner conduct initial interviews of potential 
candidates for open positions.  They also review the radar logs, field reports, and vehicle 
maintenance entries that the constables prepare, and have the authority to counsel the 
constables regarding the performance of their duties.   
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Village Mayor Gary Veglianie testified in support of the Village’s application.  
Veglianie, in addition to being Mayor, is the Village’s Police Commissioner.  As such, 
Veglianie is head of the Police Department, charged with overseeing all of its activities. 
Veglianie testified that he discusses salaries with Hennig and Turner prior to preparing a 
budget to submit to the Village board.2  With respect to constables’ salaries, Veglianie 
testified: 
Ultimately it is determined by the Village Board at budget 
time.  But prior to the budget being created, I discuss with 
Hennig and Turner my views on what the salaries should be 
and they would discuss with me what they think they should 
be and then we will come up with a number and then it 
would be proposed to the Board.  
 
For equipment purchases, Hennig and Turner make requests and the Mayor 
forwards those to the board, as well.  With respect to collective bargaining, the Mayor 
testified that the Village had decided that Hennig and Turner will assist in collective 
bargaining.  As of the date of the hearing, Hennig and Turner had not been involved in 
any collective bargaining preparations or negotiations. 
DISCUSSION 
Section 201.7(a) of the Act defines a public employee as a “person holding a 
position by appointment or employment in the service of a public employer.”  The statute 
exempts from this definition those individuals whom the Board may designate managerial 
or confidential.  In order for a public employee to be designated either managerial or 
confidential, the criteria in § 201.7(a) must be met.  Section 201.7(a) states:  
Employees may be designated as managerial only if they 
are persons (i) who formulate policy or (ii) who may 
reasonably be required on behalf of the public employer to 
assist directly in the preparation for and conduct of collective 
negotiations or to have a major role in the administration of 
agreements or in personnel administration, provided that 
                                            
2 Tr, at p 16.  
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such role is not of a routine or clerical nature and requires 
the exercise of independent judgment.   
 
Employees may be designated as confidential only if they 
are persons who assist and act in a confidential capacity to 
managerial employees concerning collective negotiations, 
contract administration or personnel administration.   
 
The statutory criteria for such designations are applied strictly, with all 
uncertainties resolved in favor of representation and coverage under the Act.3  Notably, 
unless shown to be excluded from the Act as managerial or confidential, supervisors are 
eligible for representation.4   
The Board has held that the Act establishes a two-pronged test for a confidential 
designation: the employee must both assist a managerial employee in his or her labor 
relations managerial functions and act in a confidential capacity to the managerial 
employee.5  The “former prong reflects the confidential employee’s duties, while the latter 
connotes a confidential employment relationship involving trust and confidence between 
the managerial employee and the confidential employee.”6  The two prongs  of the test 
are distinct, and satisfaction of one does not relieve the employer from satisfying the 
other.7     
                                            
3 County of Westchester, 50 PERB ¶ 3016, 3068 (2016), citing Lippman v NYS Pub Empl 
Relations Bd, 263 AD2d 891, 896, 32 PERB ¶ 7017 (3d Dept 1999), confirming 30 PERB 
¶ 3067 (1997); Town of Walworth, 43 PERB ¶ 3013, 3052 (2010); Fashion Institute of 
Technology, 42 PERB ¶ 3018, 3061 (2009); Owego-Apalachin Cent Sch Dist, 33 PERB  
¶ 3005, 3014 (2000).  
4 Fashion Institute of Technology, 42 PERB ¶ 3018, 3061 (2009); Town of East Fishkill, 
27 PERB ¶ 3073, 3166 (1994).  See also Matter of Lippman v NYS Pub Empl Relations 
Bd, 263 AD2d 891, 903.  
5 County of Westchester, 50 PERB ¶ 3016, at 3068, citing Hoosick Falls Cent Sch Dist, 
46 PERB ¶ 3015, 3033 (2013); Town of Dewitt, 32 PERB ¶ 3001, 3002 (1999). 
6 Id.  See also State of New York (Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation), 
39 PERB ¶ 3007, 3030 (2006); City of Rome, 39 PERB ¶ 3009, 3037 (2006); New York 
Power Authority, 38 PERB ¶ 3003, 3008 (2005). 
7 Id., citing Town of Dewitt, 32 PERB ¶ 3001, at 3002; Hoosick Falls Cent Sch Dist, 46 
PERB ¶ 3015, at 3033; North-Rose Wolcott Cent Sch Dist, 33 PERB ¶ 3002, 3008 
(2000).  
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The ALJ found that Hennig and Turner should be excluded as confidential 
employees based on their future involvement in the collective bargaining process and 
their involvement in making wage recommendations that have been acted upon by the 
Village board.8  The ALJ also found that Hennig and Turner have input into personnel 
administration, including hiring, staffing, and discipline.  In sum, the ALJ found that 
Hennig and Turner’s direct relationship with the Mayor/Police Commissioner and their de 
facto role of running the department qualified them for a confidential designation.   
Contrary to the ALJ, we find that the record does not support designating Hennig 
and Turner as confidential employees.  First, our designation of employees as 
confidential, like our examination of other unit placement issues, is based on the job 
duties actually performed, as shown on the record.9  Although the Mayor testified that the 
Village had decided that Hennig and Turner “will assist in collective bargaining,” the mere 
speculative possibility that employees could be assigned confidential duties in the future 
is not sufficient to warrant their designation as confidential employees.10  As we 
explained in Adirondack Community College, “the policies in favor of our consideration 
only of actual duties performed are necessary in order to avoid basing confidential 
designations on speculation, anticipation, plans or hopes of the applicants, rather than 
                                            
8 The Village argued that Hennig and Turner should be excluded either as managerial or 
confidential.  The ALJ found that Hennig and Turner were not managerial employees, 
and there were no exceptions to this finding.  As a result, any exceptions to the ALJ’s 
finding have been waived.  Rules of Procedure § 213.2(b) (4); see, eg, County of 
Chemung and Chemung County Sheriff, 50 PERB ¶ 3022, 3090 (2017); Village of 
Endicott, 47 PERB ¶ 3017, 3052, n. 5 (2014); NYCTA (Burke), 49 PERB ¶ 3021, 3072, n. 
4 (2016) (citing cases). 
9 See County of Westchester, 50 PERB ¶ 3016 at 3069, 3070; Village of Scarsdale, 49 
PERB ¶ 3009, at 3041; County of Rockland, 28 PERB ¶ 3063, 3145 (1995); Town of East 
Fishkill, 27 PERB ¶ 3073, 3166 (1994); Adirondack Community College, 20 PERB           
¶ 3070, 3149-3150 (1987); City of Binghamton, 12 PERB ¶ 3099, 3186 (1979).  
10 See County of Westchester, 50 PERB ¶ 3016, at 3069, 3070; New York Power Auth, 
38 PERB ¶ 3003, at 3008; Owego-Apalachin Cent Sch Dist, 33 PERB ¶ 3005, at 3016 n. 
16; City of Newburgh, 16 PERB ¶ 3053, 3082 (1983); City of Binghamton, 12 PERB        
¶ 3099, at 3186.  See also Village of Scarsdale, 49 PERB ¶ 3009, at 3040-3041. 
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upon evidence which is subject to scrutiny and contradiction.”11  In the absence of 
evidence that Hennig or Turner play any role in collective negotiations or contract 
administration (as of the date of the hearing, the parties had not agreed to a contract), 
they can only be designated as confidential based on their role in personnel 
administration.   
Contrary to the ALJ, we find that Hennig and Turner’s input into personnel 
administration, including hiring, staffing, and discipline, reflects nothing more than their 
supervisory status and does not justify designating them as confidential employees.  
“Supervisors at whatever level . . . are eligible for representation under current law.”12   
Finally, we find that the record does not support designating Hennig and Turner as 
confidential employees based on their suggestions and discussions with Veglianie 
regarding wage recommendations, as found by the ALJ.  Veglianie testified that  
I discuss with Hennig and Turner my views on what the 
salaries should be and they would discuss with me what they 
think they should be and then we will come up with a number 
and then it would be proposed to the [Village] Board.”13   
 
                                            
11 20 PERB ¶ 3070, at 3149-3150.  See also County of Westchester, 50 PERB ¶ 3016, at 
3069, 3070; East Meadow Union Free Sch Dist, 16 PERB ¶ 3027, 3042 (1983) (finding 
employee cannot be designated confidential “on the basis of assignments that have been 
contemplated but have not yet been made”).    
A confidential designation may be appropriate even if an employee has not yet 
performed confidential duties where the duties are contained in the employee’s job 
description but the opportunity to perform such confidential duties has not yet arisen.  
Somers Central School District, 14 PERB ¶ 3058 (1981).  This limited exception is not 
applicable here.  No job description was introduced into evidence and it is, in any event, 
undisputed that Hennig and Turner have the same Civil Service designation as other 
constables.  Thus, their job description would not contain any reference to collective-
bargaining responsibilities.  Moreover, at the time of the hearing, the Association had 
been certified for over a year and negotiations were ongoing, so the opportunity for 
Hennig and Turner to perform confidential duties (i.e. to be involved in collective 
bargaining) had already arisen. County of Westchester, 50 PERB ¶ 3016, at 3070 
(distinguishing Somers). 
12 Town of East Fishkill, 27 PERB ¶ 3073, at 3166.   
13 Tr, at 16.  
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This testimony does not establish that Hennig and Turner assist and act in a 
confidential capacity to Veglianie concerning the recommendation of wages to the Village 
board.  Rather, Veglianie’s testimony suggests to us that Hennig and Turner’s 
interactions with Veglianie on proposed salary recommendations were in furtherance of 
their own interests as employees.  That is, Hennig and Turner have access to confidential 
information (i.e., Veglianie’s proposed and final recommendations to the board) for the 
purpose of advocating for themselves, and possibly for the other constables, but not for 
the purpose of assisting Veglianie in the performance of his duties as chief executive of 
the Village.  In short, Hennig and Turner’s exposure to confidential information is not 
supportive of a confidential designation, as they were “not thereby assisting in labor 
relations duties as contemplated by [Section 201.7(a) of the Act].”14 
In sum, we find that the Village has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that 
Hennig and Turner meet the statutory criteria to justify a confidential designation,15 
especially when resolving any uncertainty in favor of coverage under the Act.   
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the application must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: November 6, 2017 
     Albany, New York 
                                            
14 Matter of Lippman v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 263 AD2d 891, 903, 32 PERB         
¶ 7017 (3d Dept 1999); cf County of Westchester, 50 PERB ¶ 3016 at 3069. 
15 County of Rockland, 28 PERB ¶ 3063, 3141 (1995); Newburgh Enlarged City Sch Dist, 
21 PERB ¶ 3047, 3102 (1988).  
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 STATE OF NEW YORK 
 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
_________________________________________ 
 
In the Matter of 
 
MICHAEL G. LEONE, 
 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-35086 
- and - 
 
STATE OF NEW YORK (OFFICE OF CHILDREN 
AND FAMILY SERVICES), 
 
Respondent.        
_________________________________________       
 
USHER Z. PILLER, for Charging Party 
 
MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE, ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL (LYNN HOMES 
LYON & CLAY J. LODOVICE of counsel), for Respondent 
 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Michael G. Leone (Leone) to a 
decision and order of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his charge alleging 
that the State of New York (Office of Children and Family Services) (OCFS) violated §§ 
209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) when it provided 
false information in a reference to a potential employer.1  The ALJ dismissed the charge 
because she found it was untimely.   
EXCEPTIONS 
Leone filed six exceptions to the ALJ’s decision, in which he argues that the 
ALJ’s ruling on timeliness was in error.  Leone argues that he filed his charge within four 
months of receiving sufficient information to allege that a violation of the Act had 
occurred.   
The State requests that the Board affirm the ALJ’s decision but, in the alternative, 
                                                     
1 50 PERB ¶ 4506 (2017). 
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argues that the charge should be dismissed because Leone, as a former public 
employee but not an active one, lacks standing to file the charge.   
 Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties’ 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ.  
FACTS 
Leone was employed by OCFS from March 2010 until he resigned from his 
position in October 2015.  Prior to resigning, Leone had taken an extended leave of 
absence from his employment and, in the spring of 2015, applied for a position with a 
governmental agency in Florida.  Leone was not hired for that position.  On or about 
September 2, 2015, Leone was informed by the bureau chief of the Florida agency that 
he was denied the job because OCFS indicated during a reference check that he had 
been disciplined during his employment.   
On September 21, 2015, Usher Piller (Piller), a union representative with the 
Public Employees Federation who represented Leone during his employment with 
OCFS, sent an email to OCFS regarding Leone.  The email stated that Leone had 
applied for employment in Florida and was informed that he would not get the position 
because a reference check with OCFS disclosed that he had been disciplined.  In the 
email, Piller stated that the information provided to the Florida agency was “patently 
false.”2   
On January 28, 2016, Leone received a copy of the reference form upon which 
the prospective employer relied.3  The reference form was completed on August 10, 
2015.   
                                                     
2 Ex A to OCFS’s Answer.  
3 Attached to charge.  
Case No. U-35086   -3- 
 
 
Leone filed his improper practice charge on May 24, 2016.  
DISCUSSION 
Section 204.1(a) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) requires an improper practice 
charge to be filed within four months of when the charging party knew or reasonably 
should have known of the conduct that forms the basis for the alleged improper 
practice.4  Here, Leone alleges that OCFS provided false information to Leone’s 
prospective employer in August of 2015.  Thus, Leone’s charge, filed on May 24, 2016, 
concerns conduct that occurred well beyond the filing period set by our Rules.   
We agree with the ALJ that Leone’s charge was untimely.  As established by 
Leone’s charge and Pillar’s email, Leone knew that OCFS had informed his potential 
employer that Leone had been disciplined while employed by OCFS in September 
2015.  Thus, Leone had knowledge of the conduct underlying the alleged improper 
practice more than four months prior to the date he filed the charge.  Leone’s attempt to 
gather more information and evidence to support his charge does not extend his time 
for filing an improper practice charge.  To “run the filing period from the date of a 
charging party's discovery of evidence in support of the charge would permit charges to 
be filed years after the act in question, a result contrary to the policies sought to be 
served by the imposition of a short filing period.”5 
 Although the Board has found a respondent to be equitably estopped from 
asserting a timeliness defense where the respondent has, through its conduct, induced 
                                                     
4 See, eg, District Council 37 (Bacchus), 50 PERB ¶ 3013, 3057-3058 (2017); UFT 
(Davis), 50 PERB ¶ 3014, 3059 (2017); New York State Thruway Auth, 40 PERB          
¶ 4533, 4595 (2007); Civil Service Employees Assn, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO, 28 PERB ¶ 3072, 3168, n. 4 (1995).   
5 State of New York (Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse Services), 32 PERB         
¶ 3036, 3083 (1999), citing County of Schoharie, 30 PERB ¶ 3055 (1997).  
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the charging party to delay filing a charge until the filing period has passed, that limited 
exception does not apply here, where there is no evidence that Leone was detrimentally 
induced to delay filing a charge until the appropriate filing period had passed.6  
Accordingly, the charge was untimely filed, and the ALJ correctly dismissed it on that 
basis.   
DATED:  November 6, 2017 
               Albany, New York 
     
     
 
 
 
                                                     
6 UFT (Davis), 50 PERB ¶ 3014, (2017); DC 37 (Bacchus), 50 PERB ¶ 3013 (2017), 
citing County of Onondaga, 12 PERB ¶ 3035, 3065 (1979), confd sub nom County of 
Onondaga v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 77 AD2d 783, 13 PERB ¶ 7011 (4th Dept 
1980) (finding charge filed 14 months after announcement of change to be timely where 
employer detrimentally induced employee organization to delay filing a challenge to 
change pending employer’s actions aimed at such revocation); Great Neck Water 
Pollution Control District, 27 PERB ¶ 3057, 3134 (1994) (finding charge filed more than 
four months after announced change timely where employer led employee organization 
to believe that that change had been rescinded).  Confirmed City of Elmira, 41 PERB    
¶ 3018, at 3086 (finding charging party failed to meet burden of demonstrating that 
respondent was equitably estopped from asserting timeliness defense).  
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Charging Party,         CASE NO. U-35574 
- and - 
 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
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BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
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RICARDO FONSECA, pro se 
 
 BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
 This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Ricardo Fonseca to a decision of 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
his improper practice charge.1  In his initial charge, Fonseca alleged that he was 
terminated from his employment with the Board of Education of the City School District 
of the City of New York (District), that he spoke to an attorney from the legal department 
of District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (DC 37) on February 13, 2017, that DC 37 
refuses to take his case to arbitration, and that he disagrees with this decision.   
 Fonseca was advised that his charge was deficient for a variety of reasons and 
was offered an opportunity to amend the charge.   
 In response, Fonseca filed an amended charge with the Director on March 6, 
                                            
1 50 PERB ¶ 4549 (2017).  
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2017, alleging DC 37 violated § 209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment 
Act (Act).  In the revised statement of facts in the charge, Fonseca alleges that he had a 
meeting with representatives from DC 37 on July 15, 2015, who informed him that “the 
allegations against [him] from those two (2) students was [sic] very severe.”  Fonseca 
also alleges, inter alia, that: 
With the impact that I had a few years ago, the Legal 
Department are [sic] refusing to take this matter to 
arbitration.  I disagree with they’re [sic] decision.  I strongly 
believe in my opinion that I deserve a second chance. 
 
 Thereafter, by notice dated April 21, 2017, the Director advised Fonseca that the 
charge remained deficient and that he needed to clarify when the events he complained 
of occurred.  He was specifically directed to provide the date(s) on which he was 
terminated from employment and when he first requested assistance from DC 37.   
 Fonseca filed a second amendment on April 26, 2017, stating that he was 
terminated from employment as a Senior School Lunch Helper on January 20, 2015.  In 
addition, Fonseca stated that he requested assistance from DC 37 on January 20, 
2015.  Finally, Fonseca alleged that the purpose of his February 2017 telephone call to 
DC 37’s legal department “was to get my case arbitrated . . . so I can get reinstated or 
rehired back to the New York City Department of Education Office of School Food and 
Nutrition Services.” 
 The Director found that Fonseca’s amended charge remained deficient, and she 
dismissed Fonseca’s charge in full.  
EXCEPTIONS 
 Fonseca filed exceptions to the Director’s decision.  Fonseca stated that he was 
“dissatisfied” with the Director’s decision and felt that he was being discriminated 
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against because of his race.  Neither DC 37 nor the District filed a response to the 
exceptions.   
 Based on our review of the record, we affirm the Director’s decision and dismiss 
the charge.   
DISCUSSION 
 Fonseca’s letter exceptions are dated August 13, 2017, and thus were timely 
filed.  However, no proof of service upon the other parties was provided.  A letter was 
sent to Fonseca on August 22, 2017, pointing out this omission and giving Fonseca an 
opportunity to provide the requisite proof of service.2  Fonseca subsequently submitted 
copies of his letter exceptions that he had sent to DC 37 and the District, dated August 
26, 2017.   
 Section 213.2(a) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) provides that a party must file 
exceptions within 15 working days after receipt of a final decision by the Director.  Such 
exceptions must be “simultaneously served upon all other parties.”3  “Timely service of 
exceptions upon all other parties is a necessary component for the filing of exceptions 
under the Rules, and this timeliness requirement is strictly applied.”4  Fonseca’s 
exceptions were not timely served on the other parties to this proceeding, and they must 
                                            
2 Both DC 37 and the District were sent copies of our letter to Fonseca.  Neither filed 
any papers in response.  
3 Id.  
4 Transport Workers Union of Greater New York, Local 100, AFL-CIO (Waters), 49 
PERB ¶ 3026, 3083 (2016); United Federation of Teachers (Hunt), 48 PERB ¶ 3005, 
3012 (2015); State of New York (Commission of Correction), 47 PERB ¶ 3019, at 3058. 
(citing UFT (Pinkard), 44 PERB ¶ 3011, 3042 (2011); UFT (Elgalad), 43 PERB ¶ 3028 
(2010); see generally Honeoye Falls-Lima Cent Sch Dist (Malcolm), 41 PERB ¶ 3015 
(2008); Town/City of Poughkeepsie Water Treatment Facility, 35 PERB ¶ 3037 (2002); 
Yonkers Fedn of Teachers (Jackson), 36 PERB ¶ 3050 (2003). 
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be denied on this basis alone.5  
 We also note that Fonseca’s exceptions are deficient because they fail to comply 
with the requirements of § 213.2(b) of our Rules.  The exceptions do not “set forth 
specifically the questions or policy to which exceptions are taken,” “identify that part of 
the decision . . . to which exceptions are taken,” or “state the grounds for exceptions.”  
Instead, Fonseca simply makes a conclusory statement that he feels that he is being 
discriminated against because of his race.  Fonseca provides no facts to support this 
claim, and conclusory statements cannot substitute for proof.  Fonseca’s unsupported 
allegations are both inappropriate and unpersuasive.   
 In view of Fonseca’s pro se status, we have examined the exceptions and the 
charge and amended charges submitted to the Director, even in light of the deficiencies 
noted above.  Even if the exceptions had been timely served and filed, we would affirm 
the Director’s decision. 
 Section 204.1(a) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) requires an improper practice 
charge to be filed within four months of when the charging party had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the conduct that forms the basis for the alleged improper 
practice.6  Here, Fonseca’s allegation is that DC 37 refused to take his case to 
arbitration after Fonseca requested assistance over his termination on January 20, 2015 
(the same day as his termination).  Fonseca also alleges that DC 37 again refused to 
take his case to arbitration after a July 15, 2015 meeting between Fonseca and DC 37.  
                                            
5 TWU (Waters), 49 PERB ¶ 3026, at 3083; UFT (Hunt), 48 PERB ¶ 3005, at 3012; UFT 
(Pinkard), 44 PERB ¶ 3011, at 3042.  
6 See, eg, District Council 37 (Bacchus), 50 PERB ¶ 3013, 3057-3058 (2017); UFT 
(Davis), 50 PERB ¶ 3014, 3059 (2017); New York State Thruway Auth, 40 PERB          
¶ 4533, 4595 (2007); Civil Service Employees Assn, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-
CIO, 28 PERB ¶ 3072, 3168, n. 4 (1995).   
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We agree with the Director that Fonseca knew by mid-July 2015 that DC 37 would not 
be pursuing his claim to arbitration.  Thus, Fonseca’s charge, filed on February 22, 
2017, concerns conduct that occurred well beyond the filing period set by our Rules.  
We also agree with the Director that the fact that Fonseca renewed his request to DC 
37 on February 13, 2017 does not extend the filing period or revive his charge.7 
  Although the Board has found a respondent to be equitably estopped from 
asserting a timeliness defense where the respondent has, through its conduct, induced 
the charging party to delay filing a charge until the filing period has passed, that limited 
exception does not apply here, where there is no evidence that Fonseca was 
detrimentally induced to delay filing a charge until the appropriate filing period had 
passed.8   
 Moreover, even if the charge were timely filed, we would affirm the Director’s 
dismissal of the charge on the merits.  The Board has often reaffirmed that “to establish 
a breach of the duty of fair representation under the Act, a charging party has the 
burden of proof to demonstrate that an employee organization’s conduct or actions are 
                                            
7 See, eg, NYCTA (Rosado), 37 PERB ¶ 3036, 3108 (2004); UFT (Paul), 23 PERB ¶ 
3038, 3077 (1990).  
8 UFT (Davis), 50 PERB ¶ 3014 (2017); DC 37 (Bacchus), 50 PERB ¶ 3013 (2017), 
citing County of Onondaga, 12 PERB ¶ 3035, 3065 (1979), confd sub nom County of 
Onondaga v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 77 AD2d 783, 13 PERB ¶ 7011 (4th Dept 
1980) (finding charge filed 14 months after announcement of change to be timely where 
employer detrimentally induced employee organization to delay filing a challenge to 
change pending employer’s actions aimed at such revocation); Great Neck Water 
Pollution Control District, 27 PERB ¶ 3057, 3134 (1994) (finding charge filed more than 
four months after announced change timely where employer led employee organization 
to believe that that change had been rescinded).  Confirmed City of Elmira, 41 PERB    
¶ 3018, at 3086 (finding charging party failed to meet burden of demonstrating that 
respondent was equitably estopped from asserting timeliness defense).  
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arbitrary, discriminatory or founded in bad faith.”9   
  As we have previously explained, the courts have: 
reject[ed] the standard . . . that “irresponsible or grossly 
negligent” conduct may form the basis for a union' s breach 
of the duty of fair representation as not within the meaning of 
improper employee organization practices set forth in Civil 
Service Law § 209-a.  An honest mistake resulting from 
misunderstanding or lack of familiarity with matters of 
procedure does not rise to the level of the requisite arbitrary, 
discriminatory or bad-faith conduct required to establish an 
improper practice by the union.10 
 
  Thus, “an employee’s mere disagreement with the tactics utilized or 
dissatisfaction with the quality or extent of representation does not constitute a breach 
of the duty of fair representation.”11 
  Fonseca has neither expressly alleged nor provided any basis upon which we 
could conclude that the representation was tainted by any “arbitrary, discriminatory or 
bad-faith conduct” sufficient to violate the duty of fair representation.  Fonseca’s charge 
and amended charges simply assert that he disagrees with DC 37’s decision not to 
pursue arbitration in his case, but his mere disagreement is not sufficient to make out a 
claim of a violation of DC 37’s duty of fair representation.   
  The charge does not set forth a claim that DC 37’s conduct was arbitrary, 
                                            
9 District Council 37 (Calendario), 49 PERB ¶ 3015, 3060 (2016), quoting UFT (Cruz), 
48 PERB ¶ 3004, 3010, petition denied, Cruz v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd, 48 PERB 
¶ 7003 (Sup Ct NY Co 2015) (internal quotation and editing marks omitted), quoting 
UFT (Munroe), 47 PERB ¶ 3031, 3095 (2014), petition denied, 48 PERB ¶ 7002 (Sup Ct 
NY Co 2015) (quoting CSEA (Bienko), 47 PERB ¶ 3027, 3082-3083 (2014)); see 
District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Farrey), 41 PERB ¶ 3027, 3119 (2008). 
10 Id.; see also Cairo-Durham Teachers Assn, 47 PERB ¶ 3008, 3026 (2014) 
(quoting CSEA, L 1000 v NYS Pub Empl Relations Bd (Diaz), 132 AD 2d 430, 432, 20 
PERB ¶ 7024, 7039 (3d Dept 1987), affd on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB       
¶ 7017 (1988)). 
11 Id. 
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discriminatory or in bad faith as required to establish a breach of the Act.12  Accordingly, 
even if the improper practice charge were timely, it would be dismissed for failure to 
allege facts indicating a violation of the Act.   
  Based upon the foregoing, we deny the exceptions, affirm the decision of the 
Director, and dismiss the charge.  
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the improper practice charge is dismissed. 
DATED:  November 6, 2017 
     Albany, New York 
 
     
 
                                            
12 See TWU (Waters), 49 PERB ¶ 3026, at 3083; CSEA (Bienko), 47 PERB ¶ 3027, at 
3082-3083; CSEA (Smulyan), 45 PERB ¶ 3008, 3017 (2012).  
 
